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The doctrine of church autonomy1 is distinct from the two more familiar lines of cases 
decided under the Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause, respectively. Routine 
Establishment Clause disputes such as those over religious preferences,2 government funding for 
 
* R.B. Price Emeritus Professor and Isabelle Wade & Paul C. Lyda Emeritus Professor of Law, University of 
Missouri. Thanks to those who were generous with their time reviewing an earlier draft of the essay: Lael 
Weinberger, Michael Moses, Charles Ensey, Hiram Sasser, Frederick Claybrook, Victoria Dorfman, Nathan 
Chapman, and Eric Treen. Copyright November 2021. 
1 The term “church autonomy” was first used by law professor Paul G. Kauper in Church Autonomy and the First 
Amendment: The Presbyterian Church Case, 1969 SUP. CT. REV. 347 (1969). However, the concept of church 
autonomy was pointedly recognized as being lodged in the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence as early as Mark 
DeWolfe Howe, Foreward: Political Theory and the Nature of Liberty, 67 HARV. L. REV. 91 (1953). Professor 
Howe’s essay remarks on the Court’s recent decision in Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952). 
In lieu of church autonomy, some courts use the term “ecclesiastical abstention.” But “abstention” suggests 
that the doctrine is discretionary. It is not. When it applies, church autonomy doctrine is a requirement of the First 
Amendment. 
2 See, e.g., Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 474 U.S. 703 (1985) (statute granting to private-sector employees the 
unyielding right to have Sabbath accommodated was religious preference violative of Establishment Clause). On the 
other hand, a religious exemption does not violate the Establishment Clause. See Corp. of Presiding Bishop v. 
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religious entities,3 and government-sponsored religious symbols4 are now resolved by a series of 
rules (not standards) followed over the last two decades by the High Court.5 Stand-alone Free 
Exercise Clause cases are resolved by first sorting those complaints charging that the 
government has intentionally imposed a burden on a claimant’s religious beliefs or practices 
(they get Lukumi-like6 struct scrutiny) from complaints over laws that impose a religious burden 
only as a consequence of neutral and generally applicable legislation (they get a pass under 
Employment Division v. Smith,7 as narrowed by Fulton v. City of Philadelphia8). The threshold 
task of sorting the Lukumi sheep from the Smith goats often presages whether the claim prevails 
on the merits. In contrast, church autonomy has its own exclusive line of precedent running from 
Watson v. Jones9 through Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral10—where the doctrine was first 
recognized as having First Amendment stature—and culminating with renewed vigor for 
religious institutional autonomy in the Supreme Court’s unanimous decision of Hosanna-Tabor 
Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC.11 
 
Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987) (holding that religious employer exemption to civil rights law did not violate the 
Establishment Clause). 
3 See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (state school voucher plan available to schools, 
including religious schools, did not violate the Establishment Clause). 
4 See, e.g., American Legion v. American Humanist Assoc., 139 S. Ct. 2067 (2019) (plurality opinion, in part) (high 
visibility World War I memorial featuring a 40-foot high Latin cross that was maintained by a state did not violate 
Establishment Clause). Religious symbols are upheld if religiously inclusive when first commissioned and the 
message does not disparage any faith. 
5 The earlier period in which courts applied a three-prong standard is long dormant. Cf. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 
U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (Establishment Clause violated if law’s purpose is religious, its substantial effect is to 
advance religion, or it resulted in excessive entanglement with religion). 
6 See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (holding that city ordinances that were 
gerrymandered to discriminate against church’s ritual sacrifice of animals violated Free Exercise Clause). 
7 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that generally applicable legislation, neutral as to religion, that has a disparate impact 
on the religious practices of some does not state a claim under Free Exercise Clause). 
8 141 S. Ct. 1868 (2021) (holding that a municipality may not terminate its foster-care services contract with a social 
service provider on the ground that provider declines, for reasons of religious belief, to certify same-sex couples as 
foster parents). The contract had a clause prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. It also had a 
provision permitting individualized exceptions for good cause, yet the city had not exercised its discretion to 
accommodate the provider’s religious beliefs. Fulton thus made it clear that a generally applicable law cannot 
include exemptions or exceptions for secular reasons while denying them for religious reasons. To make an 
accommodation for some but not for a religious belief or practice is to devalue religion. When the Court gets to 
applying strict scrutiny, every free-exercise claim becomes an as-applied case. Here the municipality was unable to 
show any substantial reason not to exempt this particular religious service provider, thus relief was ordered. 
9 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1872). There were disputes over the ownership of church property decided by the Supreme 
Court long before Watson, but they were decided on bases other than the First Amendment and church autonomy. 
These very early cases are collected at Michael W. McConnell, The Supreme Court’s Earliest Church-State Cases: 
Windows on Religious-Cultural-Political Conflict in the Early Republic, 37 TULSA L. REV. 7 (2013). 
10 344 U.S. 94. 
11 565 U.S. 171 (2012). 
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Stated differently, for some time now—but, one might say, hidden in plain sight—there 
have been not two, but three different sorts of religious-freedom cases decided under the 
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment. That explains why the Smith case, which is in the Free 
Exercise Clause line of cases, was said by the Court to be inapplicable in Hosanna-Tabor, a 
church autonomy case.12 This sidestepping of Smith by the Hosanna-Tabor Court initially 
puzzled a lot of legal scholars—and admittedly the Court did not at first explain the distinction 
well.13 But now that commentators have tumbled to the fact that there are three lines of cases that 
cover the range of First Amendment religious-freedom claims, the threshold task of bringing to 
bear the correct line of precedent is becoming routine. That the two Religion Clauses14 have 
given rise to three distinct lines of constitutional precedent is, of course, evidence of far deeper 
goings on. And this essay will turn very shortly to the juridical and historical rationales that 
underlie these distinctions. 
The church autonomy line of precedent consists of only a dozen Supreme Court cases 
decided upon plenary review.15 The line is topped by the Court’s 2012 decision in Hosanna-
 
12 Id. at 189-90. 
13 Speaking for the Hosanna-Tabor Court, Chief Justice Roberts wrote: 
[A] church’s selection of its ministers is unlike an individual’s ingestion of peyote [as in 
Employment Division v. Smith]. Smith involved government regulation of only outward physical 
acts. The present case, in contrast, concerns government interference with an internal church 
decision that affects the faith and mission of the church itself. See [Smith, 494 U.S.] at 877 
(distinguishing the government’s regulation of “physical acts” from its “lend[ing] its power to one 
or the other side in controversies over religious authority or dogma”). 
565 U.S. at 190. Accordingly, there is a subject-matter class of cases to which the rule in Smith does not apply. The 
Court characterized the firing of a teacher in Hosanna-Tabor as an “internal church decision,” meaning a decision of 
self-governance, while characterizing the ingestion of peyote in Smith as an “outward physical act.” It follows that 
the firing of the teacher regulated by the Americans with Disability Act was not an “outward physical act” but an 
“internal church decision.” Contrasting “outward physical acts” with “internal decisions” was unhelpful and soon 
abandoned. 
14 U.S. CONST., AMEND. 1, begins “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” This is one clause with two participial phrases (“respecting an entablement” 
and “prohibiting the free exercise”). Nevertheless, the longstanding convention is to refer to them as clauses rather 
than phrases. 
15 In chronological order, the Supreme Court’s principal church autonomy cases are: Watson, 80 U.S. 679 (involving 
control over church property disputed by factions within a church); Bouldin v. Alexander, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 131, 
139-40 (1872) (involving an attempted takeover of a church by rogue elements); Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic 
Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1 (1929) (involving the authority to appoint or remove a church minister); Kedroff, 344 U.S. 
94 (involving a governmental attempt to alter the polity of a church); Kreshik v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 363 U.S. 
190 (1960) (per curiam) (involving a governmental attempt to alter the polity of a church); Presbyterian Church v. 
Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969) (involving control over church property disputed by 
factions within a church); Maryland & Va. Churches of God v. Church at Sharpsburg, 396 U.S. 367 (1970) (per 
curiam) (involving control over church property disputed by factions within a church); Serbian Eastern Orthodox 
Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976) (involving the authority to appoint or remove a church minister and to 
reorganize the church polity); Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979) (involving control over church property disputed 
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Tabor, the importance of which cannot be overstated. The Court’s newest pronouncement on 
church autonomy in Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru is a reaffirmation and 
clarification (some say a modest expansion) of who is a minister for purposes of the “ministerial 
exception,” a defense available in civil rights antidiscrimination litigation.16 There is this third 
line of Religion Clause precedent because the doctrine of church autonomy is about something 
different from a personal right to religious liberty, the right more typically secured by the Free 
Exercise Clause that shifts to the government the burden of strict-scrutiny balancing. In contrast, 
the church autonomy doctrine is positioned by the Court to rest on both the Establishment Clause 
and the Free Exercise Clause.17 It is not a personal right rooted in an individual’s religious 
beliefs, but a zone of protection for an entity’s internal governance that is attendant to the 
organization’s religious character. Importantly, once the elements of the ministerial exception are 
shown by the church or other religious organization to be present, the lawsuit is at an end; there 
is no plaintiff’s rejoinder.18 The doctrine thus affords the church a defense in the nature of a 
categorical immunity—something like a government-free zone.19 
 
by factions within a church); Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (involving the rule prohibiting civil 
authorities from taking up religious questions); Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. 171 (involving application of the 
ministerial exception); Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049 (2020) (involving 
application of the ministerial exception). 
 There are additional cases rooted in church autonomy doctrine, but the Court attributed the result to a basis 
different than the First Amendment. See, e.g., Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867) (holding that 
priest cannot be deprived of ability to perform ecclesial duties because of failure to take exculpatory oath following 
Civil War); Rector of Holy Trinity Church v. U.S., 143 U.S. 457 (1892) (refusing to apply to clergy legislation by 
Congress forbidding aliens to come to U.S. for employment); NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 
(1979) (adopting rule of construction that presumes religious organizations are exempt from congressional 
regulatory statutes that would otherwise entangle government in matters of internal religious governance). 
16 140 S. Ct. 2049. On what Our Lady adds to Hosanna-Tabor, see Helen M. Alvaré, Church Autonomy After Our 
Lady of Guadalupe School: Too Broad? Or Broad As It Needs To Be? 25 TEX. REV. L. & POLITICS 319 (2021). 
17 Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 184 (“The Establishment Clause prevents the Government from appointing ministers, 
and the Free Exercise Clause prevents it from interfering with the freedom of religious groups to select their own.”); 
id. at 188-89 (“By imposing an unwanted minister, the state infringes the Free Exercise Clause, which protects a 
religious group’s right to shape its own faith and mission through its appointments. According the state power to 
determine which individuals will minister to the faithful also violates the Establishment Clause, which prohibits 
government involvement in such ecclesiastical decisions.”); see also Our Lady, 140 S. Ct. at 2060 (“State 
interference in that sphere would obviously violate the free exercise of religion, and any attempt by government to 
dictate or even to influence such matters would constitute one of the central attributes of an establishment of 
religion.”). 
18 Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 196 (“When a minister who has been fired sues her church alleging that her 
termination was discriminatory, the First Amendment has struck the balance for us.”). 
19 Id. at 194 (“The EEOC and Perich suggest that Hosanna-Tabor’s asserted religious reason for firing Perich . . . 
was pretextual. That suggestion misses the point of the ministerial exception. The purpose of the exception is not to 
safeguard a church’s decision to fire a minister only when it is made for a religious reason. The exception instead 




The doctrine of church autonomy protects a relatively discrete field of internal operations 
performed by religious organizations—a field described in Hosanna-Tabor as matters pertaining 
to “the internal governance of the church.”20 But if this zone of government-free operations is 
relatively compact, these are functions that go to the very heart of a religious entity’s ability to 
maintain control over the organization and command its destiny. Moreover, church autonomy is 
an exclusive space for such internal operations, be they characterized as religious or secular. It is 
for the church and similar religious entities to occupy this center of authority to the exclusion of 
other powers. In short, the doctrine of church autonomy is doing different work by a different 
means. 
The scholarly literature on church autonomy is extensive,21 with the number of articles on 
the subject nearly outstripping the number of cases of this type reported by the federal courts of 
appeal. While Hosanna-Tabor succinctly defined matters of church autonomy as those actions 
that involve the “internal governance” of a religious organization,22 and Kedroff limited the 
operations to matters “strictly ecclesiastical,”23 Part I of this article will show that the Supreme 
Court’s church autonomy cases yield five protected areas for religious organizations. These are 
the formation of religious doctrine and its interpretation; the choice of ecclesiology and 
 
20 Id. at 188. 
21 For scholars generally supportive of church autonomy, see Richard W. Garnett & John M. Robinson, Hosanna-
Tabor, Religious Freedom, and the Constitutional Structure, 2011–2012 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 307; Richard W. 
Garnett, “The Freedom of the Church”: (Towards) An Exposition, Translation, and Defense, 21 J. OF CONTEMP. 
LEGAL ISS. 33 (2013); Douglas Laycock, Hosanna-Tabor and the Ministerial Exception, 35 HARV. J. L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 839 (2012); Michael W. McConnell, Reflections on Hosanna-Tabor, 35 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 821 
(2012); Marc O. DeGirolami, The Two Separations in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 396, 398-413 (Michael D. Breidenbach & Owen Anderson, eds. 2020); Christopher C. 
Lund, Free Exercise Reconceived: The Logic and Limits of Hosanna-Tabor, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1183 (2014); 
Steven D. Smith, Freedom of Religion or Freedom of the Church?, in LEGAL RESPONSES TO RELIGIOUS PRACTICES 
IN THE UNITED STATES 267 (Austin Sarat ed., 2012); Richard W. Garnett, Religion and Group Rights: Are Churches 
(Just) Like the Boy Scouts?, 22 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT 515 (2007); Thomas C. Berg et al., Religious 
Freedom, Church-State Separation, and the Ministerial Exception, 106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 175, 179 (2011); 
Michael P. Moreland, Religious Free Exercise and Anti-Discrimination Law, 70 ALB. L. REV. 1417 (2007). For a 
positive reception to the idea of church autonomy but with reservations, see Andrew Koppelman, “Freedom of the 
Church” and the Authority of the State, 21 J. OF CONTEMP. LEGAL ISS. 145 (2013); John D. Inazu, The Freedom of 
the Church (New Revised Standard Version), 21 J. OF CONTEMP. LEGAL ISS. 335 (2013). For critics of church 
autonomy, see Richard C. Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, Lost in Translation: A Dilemma for Freedom of the 
Church, 21 J. OF CONTEMP. LEGAL ISS. 15 (2013); Richard Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, Against Religious 
Institutionalism, 99 VA. L. REV. 917 (2013); Frederick Mark Gedicks, Dignity, History, and Religious-Group 
Rights, 21 J. OF CONTEMP. LEGAL ISS. 273 (2013); Caroline Mala Corbin, The Irony of Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical 
Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 951 (2012); Leslie C. Griffin, The Sins of Hosanna-
Tabor, 88 INDIANA L.J. 981 (2013). 
22 565 U.S. at 188. 
23 344 U.S. at 119. 
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organizational polity; the appointment, promotion, training, and removal of clergy, along with 
other religious functionaries and policy leaders; the admission and removal of members, 
including a determination of members and affiliates in good standing; and communication with 
insiders about the foregoing subjects and activities, because such communications are necessary 
to the enjoyment of the first four subject areas. As we shall see, claims are being made for church 
autonomy that are overly broad, and yet other forces are pressuring to unduly constrain the 
territory set aside by this rule of nonentanglement with the government. 
Part II then identifies four types of legal claims and defenses that commonly arise in the 
course of litigation where the doctrine of church autonomy is implicated: the defense known as 
the “ministerial exception,” first raised in employment antidiscrimination claims; the rule 
prohibiting the resolution of religious questions by civil authorities; the rules for resolving 
internecine disputes between two factions within a church or denomination; and defamation 
claims based on communications that arose out of ecclesiastical decisions and events. 
The primary work of constitutional structure is keeping in right relationship centers of 
power, including church and state, in contrast to elevating particular personal rights. Part III 
takes up those features to church autonomy litigation that follow when the principle at work is 
structural, separating government and church, as opposed to rights-based. That can affect a 
surprising range of practices and procedures before a court reaches the merits, such as the 
necessity for the trial court to resolve a church-autonomy defense at the outset of a lawsuit, lest 
probing discovery and pre-trial motions themselves so entangle the church with civil judicial 
process as to generate a fresh invasion of the autonomy doctrine. Because structure cannot be 
waived, a church autonomy defense may be raised sui sponte.  
Finally, Part IV surveys the relevant history from the American founding that speaks to 
constitutional originalism and the things about a church that are not Caesar’s. In Western 
Civilization, there is a long and rich history of differentiating between the operations of church 
and those of empire (later “kingdom,” and still later “state”), the threads of which can be traced 
all the way back to the 2nd century.24 But as the Supreme Court observed first in Hosanna-Tabor 
and again in Our Lady, the binding historical backdrop to the First Amendment is the colonial 
and early national story of disestablishment. Revolutionary Americans broke away from the 
 




ideas of Christendom that undergirded the Church of England, as headed by the Crown and 
established by Parliament,25 and instead adopted the wholly novel principles that drove religious 
disestablishment as a means of disentangling the church from the corrupting hand of government 
in the newly forming states. 
I. FIVE SUBJECT MATTERS PROTECTED BY THE CHURCH AUTONOMY DOCTRINE 
A helpful way of thinking about church-state relations is to envision two different entities 
with a large territory of overlapping interests, but also with each having its own zone of 
exclusive authority. Alternatively, a federal circuit court of appeals has suggested that the 
concept of church autonomy is “best understood” as “marking a boundary between two separate 
polities, the secular and the religious.”26 These visual pictures raise the questions: What is the 
zone occupied by the church to exclusion of the civil authorities? Where is this boundary line 
that marks off the authority of the church to the exclusion of the state? 
The Supreme Court has responded to these inquiries with general language, the most 
quoted being a passage from Kedroff recognizing that the First Amendment grants “a spirit of 
freedom for religious organizations, an independence from secular control or manipulation—in 
short, power to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government 
as well as those of faith and doctrine.”27 Similarly, Milivojevich recited that the First Amendment 
permits religious organizations “to establish their own rules and regulations for internal 
discipline and government” and that civil authorities must defer to the decisions of such 
organizations “on matters of discipline, faith, internal organization, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, 
or law”; these same civil authorities are prohibited from delving into matters of “theological 
controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the conformity of the members of 
the church to the standard of morals required of them.”28 And Hosanna-Tabor recalled a passage 
in Watson which says that “whenever the questions of discipline, or of faith or ecclesiastical rule, 
custom or law” have been resolved by a church, the matter is closed and not to be relitigated by 
the civil authorities.29 An equally general passage appeared in Our Lady in explanation of the 
unanimous result in Hosanna-Tabor: “The constitutional foundation for our holding was the 
 
25 Our Lady, 140 S. Ct. at 2061-62, 2065-66; Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 182-85. 
26 Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 677 (7th Cir. 2013). 
27 344 U.S. at 116 (footnote omitted). 
28 426 U.S. at 713, 714, 724. 
29 565 U.S. at 185 (quoting Watson, 80 U.S. at 727). 
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general principle of church autonomy to which we have already referred: independence in 
matters of faith and doctrine and in closely linked matters of internal government.”30 
Accordingly, the doctrine of church autonomy extends a zone of independence to those relatively 
few but “core” administrative practices and “key” personnel functions that go to the control and 
destiny of a religious entity.31 
While this general language is a helpful starting point, more detail is needed to solve 
close disputes. From the full range of the High Court’s case law, we know that church autonomy 
has been found to protect five areas of internal governance over which a religious organization is 
sovereign: (1) the determination and interpretation of religious doctrine;32 (2) the determination 
of the organization’s polity or governance structure, including its embodiment in canons and 
bylaws;33 (3) the hiring, training, supervising, promoting, and removing of clergy, worship 
 
30 Our Lady, 140 S. Ct. at 2061. Also commonly cited is Justice William Brennan’s concurring opinion in Corp. of 
Presiding Bishop v. Amos, joined by Justice Thurgood Marshall, which delved into the church autonomy theme: 
[R]eligious organizations have an interest in autonomy in ordering their internal affairs, so that they 
may be free to: “select their own leaders, define their own doctrines, resolve their own disputes, and 
run their own institutions.” . . . For many individuals, religious activity derives meaning in large 
measure from participation in a larger religious community. Such a community represents an 
ongoing tradition of shared beliefs, an organic entity not reducible to a mere aggregation of 
individuals. Determining that certain activities are in furtherance of an organization’s religious 
mission, and that only those committed to that mission should conduct them, is thus a means by 
which a religious community defines itself. 
483 U.S. at 341-42 (quoting Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of 
Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373, 1389 (1981)). 
31 140 S. Ct. at 2055 (“core”); Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 199 (Alito, J., concurring) (“key”). 
32 See Church at Sharpsburg, 396 U.S. at 368 (holding that courts cannot adjudicate doctrinal disputes); 
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. at 449-51 (refusing to follow a rule that discourages changes in doctrine); Watson, 
80 U.S. at 725-33 (rejecting implied-trust rule because of its departure-from-doctrine inquiry); see also Thomas, 450 
U.S. at 715-16 (holding that courts are not arbiters of scriptural interpretation); Order of St. Benedict v. Steinhauser, 
234 U.S. 640, 647-51 (1914) (finding that religious practices concerning vow of poverty and communal ownership 
of property are not violative of individual liberty and will be enforced by the courts). 
Care must be exercised to not confuse the determination or interpretation of doctrine, which are covered by 
church autonomy, with the application of doctrine. All manner of activities and expressions could sincerely be said 
to be an application of one’s understanding of his religious doctrine, but that does not make them a matter of church 
autonomy. The application of doctrine, rather, is a matter to be addressed as a straightforward claim under the Free 
Exercise Clause. The Texas Supreme Court recently confused the determination of doctrine with its application in In 
re Diocese of Lubbock. 624 S.W.3d 506 (Tex. 2021), petition for cert. filed, 2021 WL 4173594 (U.S. Sept. 13, 
2021) (No. 21-398). In that case—a claim for defamation—the court mistakenly regarded as a protected 
determination of doctrine a diocese’s decision about releasing to the public a list of clerics credibly accused of 
having abused a minor. This decision, however, is best understood as a practical application of doctrine, not a 
determination of doctrine, and thus not protected by the doctrine of church autonomy. 
33 See Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 708-24 (civil courts may not probe into church polity); Presbyterian Church, 393 
U.S. at 451 (civil courts may not interpret and weigh church doctrine); Kreshik, 363 U.S. at 191 (First Amendment 
prevents judiciary, as well as legislature, from interfering in ecclesiastical governance of Russian Orthodox Church); 
Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 119 (same); Shepard v. Barkley, 247 U.S. 1, 2 (1918) (aff’d mem.) (courts may not interfere 
with merger of two Presbyterian denominations). 
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leaders, and other employees with explicitly religious functions as well as policy leaders;34 (4) 
the determination of who is admitted to and expelled from membership, as well as which 
members and affiliates are in good standing;35 and (5) internal communications of the religious 
organization pertaining to the full enjoyment of the prior four subjects. 
 Bryce v. Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Colorado, is illustrative of the fifth item 
concerning internal communications that are instrumental to the enjoyment of the prior four 
categories.36 In Bryce, an Episcopalian church was sued by the youth minister and her domestic 
partner. Local church authorities had discovered that the youth minister was in a homosexual 
relationship. She was promptly transferred to duties that did not entail contact with youth and she 
was told she would be dismissed at the end of the year. At follow-on church meetings, the same 
authorities communicated to parents of the youth that the youth minister’s same-sex relationship 
was the reason for her reassignment. The minister and her partner were present at and 
participated in these meetings. Among the various legal claims later brought by the couple was 
sexual harassment based on the exposure of their same-sex relationship during the meetings. The 
trial and circuit courts held that the church’s internal communications were protected by church 
autonomy.37 The youth minister herself—as an employee of the defendant—was subject to the 
third category of church autonomy: the ministerial exception. But the youth minister’s partner, 
though not employed by the church, was also subject to the general doctrine of church autonomy, 
 
34 See Our Lady, 140 S. Ct. at 2062; Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 190-95; Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 708-20 (civil 
courts may not probe into defrocking of cleric); Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 116 (courts may not probe into clerical 
appointments); Gonzalez, 280 U.S. at 16 (declining to intervene on behalf of petitioner who sought order directing 
archbishop to appoint petitioner to ecclesiastical office). See also Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 501-04 (refusal by 
Court to force collective bargaining on parochial school because of interference with relationship between church 
superiors and lay teachers); Rector of Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 472 (1892) (refusing to 
apply generally applicable law preventing employment of aliens to church's clerical appointment); Cummings, 71 
U.S. 277 (unconstitutional to prevent priest from assuming his ecclesiastical position because of refusal to take 
loyalty oath). 
35 See Bouldin, 82 U.S. at 139-40 (“This is not a question of membership of the church, nor of the rights of members 
as such. It may be conceded that we have no power to revise or question ordinary acts of church discipline, or of 
excision from membership. . . . [W]e cannot decide who ought to be members of the church, nor whether the 
excommunicated have been regularly or irregularly cut off.”); Watson, 80 U.S. at 733 (court has no jurisdiction over 
church discipline or the conformity of church members to the standard of morals required of them). See also Order 
of St. Benedict, 234 U.S. at 647-51 (so long as individual voluntarily joined a religious group and is free to leave at 
any time, religious liberty is not violated and members are bound to prior rules consensually entered into, such as 
vow of poverty and communal ownership of property). The subject of autonomy does not include the “discipline” of 
members, which could be quite far reaching. But this point and the next do include the confidential communication 
to other members concerning the discipline or expulsion of a member. 
36 289 F.3d 648 (10th Cir. 2002). 
37 Id. at 657-59. 
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but under the fifth category which safeguards internal communications. The communications 
were relevant to the governance of the church in order to explain to the church members and 
parents the reason for the abrupt reassignment of the youth minister to whom some of the 
children had become attached. The claim by the minister’s partner was also dismissed because 
her complaint of sexual harassment was derivative of the protected employment decision to 
dismiss the youth minister.38 
 Legal counsel to religious organizations sometimes try to shoehorn a case into a category 
where it does not belong. Illustrative is an argument made in a brief amici curia filed in support 
of a petition for writ of certiorari in Roman Catholic Diocese of Albany v. Lacewell.39 The 
question presented in Lacewell concerns New York legislation requiring employers to provide 
health care benefits to employees that includes coverage for elective abortions. Naturally enough, 
pro-life religious organizations object to compliance with the law as violating their right to free 
exercise of religion. Plaintiffs certainly appear to meet the threshold of stating a prima facie 
claim for relief under the Free Exercise Clause. However, amici argued that the New York 
abortion mandate violates church autonomy.40 This is not so. The New York legislation does not 
itself seek to regulate a religious organization’s internal governance as the U.S. Supreme Court 
uses that term. True, the state law certainly imposes a substantial burden on such an 
organization’s application of its religious doctrine concerning the unborn, but it does not 
determine or interpret that doctrine. A straightforward free-exercise claim is altogether different 
from a church autonomy claim.41 The danger of overreach by legal counsel for the church, or in 
 
38 Id. at 658-59, 658 n.2. 




40 Brief of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints et al., Lacewell, No. 20-1501 (filed May 26, 2021), available 
at https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/20/20-1501/180185/20210526121754439_20-
1501acTheChurchOfJesusChristOfLatter-DaySaints.pdf. On November 1, 2021, the Supreme Court granted the 
petition for certiorari, vacated the opinion below, and remanded with directions to reconsider the case in light of its 
decision in Fulton. Order List (11/01/2021) (supremecourt.gov). Fulton is a free exercise case not a church 
autonomy case, so this disposition is entirely consistent with the discussion in the text.   
41 This is why cases like Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Calif. Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378 (1990) and Tony & 
Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985) are distinguishable from cases involving the 
church autonomy doctrine. Church autonomy extends to the formation and revision of doctrine, but not the 
application or practice of doctrine. The argument that a wage and hour law or a use tax imposes a substantial burden 
on a religious organization is to be taken up as a straightforward claim under the Free Exercise Clause. That was 
done in both Jimmy Swaggart and Alamo Foundation, albeit the claims were ultimately unsuccessful. 
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this instances the amici, the civil courts might not just reject the argument but might overshoot 
and unduly narrow the doctrine of church autonomy. 
II. IN WHAT SORTS OF DISPUTES IS CHURCH AUTONOMY APPLICABLE? 
 What are the common patterns of disputes or the sorts of factual settings where church 
autonomy has often been implicated? As the case law has unfolded, the doctrine of church 
autonomy has been frequently invoked in four dispute patterns: (1) a plaintiff sues a religious 
entity for employment discrimination (or a related common-law claim), and the entity invokes 
the ministerial exception to block the lawsuit; (2) a lawsuit raises questions that concern the 
validity, meaning, or importance of religious assertions or disputes, and civil authorities refuse to 
take up those questions; (3) a disagreement between two factions within a church or 
denomination is brought before the civil authorities, who then defer to the determination by the 
highest ecclesial judicatory; and (4) a party sues for defamation based on communications that 
arose out of a matter of internal governance, and the defendant pleads church autonomy as a 
defense. As to the third pattern, in lieu of deferring to the proper ecclesial judicatory, the 
Supreme Court has permitted states the alternative of adopting a rule of decision characterized as 
“neutral principles of law.” Resort to this alternative, however, has been permitted by the 
Supreme Court only in cases where the two factions have abandoned attempts at resolving their 
underlying doctrinal differences and decided to go their separate ways, thus the only matter that 
remains for civil resolution via “neutral principles” is who gets legal title to the church property. 
Although most church autonomy cases fall into one of these four patterns, this list is not a 
closed set. Occasionally there are matters outside these patterns where church autonomy is still 
applicable. For example, the principles behind the ministerial exception have been found 
applicable where the disputing parties lack an employment relationship.42 The exemption was 
also found to apply when a state university sought to control the moral qualifications of the 
leaders of student religious organizations on its campus.43 And on occasion, courts have declined 
 
42 See, e.g., Bryce, 289 F.3d at 657-59 (holding that in a lawsuit where there were two plaintiffs and one was not an 
employee of the church, the church autonomy defense was still applicable to the nonemployee). 
43 See, e.g., InterVarsity Christian Fellowship/USA v. Bd. of Governors of Wayne State Univ., 2021 WL 1387787 
(E.D. Mich. Apr. 13, 2021) (overturning university regulation barring student religious organizations from having 
statement of faith and morality code requirements for student leaders). 
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to entertain a lawsuit asserting a right to attain or hold an uncompensated ecclesiastical 
appointment.44 
A. The Ministerial Exception 
The “ministerial exception” is an affirmative defense in the nature of a categorical 
immunity enjoyed by churches and similar religious entities that prevents them from being sued 
by employees whose job description includes religious functions.45 The term ministerial 
exception is widely acknowledged to be a misnomer,46 but the courts and commentators have yet 
to settle on a more apt label.47 For example, the ministerial exception applies to more than just 
claims brought by clergy, members of a religious order, and other ecclesiastics. Rather, it applies 
to any executive leader or worship leader of a religious organization, and to any employee of a 
religious organization with duties some of which are explicitly religious in function.48 
Furthermore, “minister” is largely a Protestant term. Catholic and Orthodox Christians generally 
do not use the term, nor do Jews, Muslims, and others.49 
The ministerial exception is a defense to more than just claims by employees of churches 
and other houses of worship. The defense extends to entities that engage in explicitly religious 
 
44 See, e.g., Chavis v. Roe, 93 N.J. 103, 459 A.2d 674 (1983) (involving a claim for damages by a deacon and his 
wife being defrocked and removed from his post, apparently over a dispute with the pastor; after expressing some 
doubt as to whether one’s status as a deacon entailed a loss for which there could be a remedy, the court dismissed 
citing First Amendment concerns). 
45 Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 195 n.4 (concluding that the ministerial exception is an affirmative defense). For 
more discussion on church autonomy as an affirmative defense, see infra notes 213-26 and accompanying text. 
46 Our Lady, 140 S. Ct. at 2064; Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 198-99 (Alito, J., concurring). 
47 One suggestion is to start referring to the “ministerial exception” as “church autonomy” because the exception is a 
sub-application of that doctrine. Without any confusion or loss in meaning, Justice Alito did that on one occasion in 
Our Lady, 140 S. Ct. at 2061. 
48 Id. at 2064 (“[T]he exception should include ‘any employee who leads a religious organization, conducts worship 
services or important religious ceremonies or rituals, or serves as a messenger or teacher of its faith.’”) (quoting 
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 199 (Alito, J., concurring)). Our Lady and Hosanna-Tabor involved religious 
elementary school teachers as ministers. Other cases have found to satisfy the definition of ministers a religious 
school principal, Rehfield v. Diocese of Joliet, 2021 IL 125656 (2021); a church minister of music, EEOC v. Roman 
Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, N.C., 213 F.3d 795 (4th Cir. 2000); an archdiocese’s communications manager, Alicea-
Hernandez v. Archdiocese of Chicago, 2002 WL 598517 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 18, 2002); and the chair of the religion 
department and campus chaplain at a Catholic college, Simon v. Saint Dominic Acad., 2021 WL 1660851 (D.N.J. 
Apr. 28, 2021). See also Starkey v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Indianapolis, Inc., 2021 WL 3669050 (S.D. Ind. 
Aug. 11, 2021) (guidance counselor and member of faculty administrative team at Catholic high school found to 
meet the definition of minister); EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (Catholic University 
faculty member in the canon law department is minister); EEOC v. Sw. Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277 
(5th Cir. 1981) (faculty and administrators at a seminary are ministers). Cf. DeWeese-Boyd v. Gordon College, 163 
N.E.3d 1000 (Mass. 2021) (member of faculty teaching social work at Christian college is not a minister for 
purposes of ministerial exception), petition for cert. filed, 2021 WL 3406193 (U.S. Aug. 3, 2021) (No. 21-145). See 
generally Christopher Lund, In Defense of the Ministerial Exception, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1 (2011) (collecting cases). 
49 Our Lady, 140 S. Ct. at 2063-64; Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 198 (Alito, J., concurring). 
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activities similar or related to those of a church, such as K-12 religious schools that seek to 
transmit the faith to the next generation.50 It makes less sense, however, to allow the defense by 
an entity that is marginally religious or that is religious in origin but that over time has largely 
secularized.51 Simply put, the doctrine seeks to preserve the sovereignty of religious 
organizations that at least partly and genuinely engage in explicitly religious activities such as 
prayer, worship, observing sacraments, proselytizing, teaching religion, spiritual formation, or 
otherwise deepening or expanding the faith. That means entities that fall outside the scope of 
worship, teaching, propagating the faith, and so on ought not to be able to rely on the 
immunity.52 
But how is a civil magistrate to determine that an employer is truly religious so as to 
benefit from the ministerial exception without violating the rule against civil authorities taking 
up questions about what is or is not central or important to a religion?53 The manner by which 
this is worked out consistent with the First Amendment is illustrated by a recent administrative 
labor-law ruling. For reasons of church autonomy, lay faculty at a religious college are not 
permitted to organize a labor union under the National Labor Relations Act.54 Prior case law had 
recognized collective bargaining rights for lay faculty unless a college was deemed “substantially 
religious in character.”55 That put the National Labor Relations Board in the position of making 
exacting inquiries into the curriculum, faculty tasks, and faith tenor of the student culture on 
campus, and then probing the religious importance the college puts on these matters. However, 
judging the degree of religiosity concerning matters of campus life would be unconstitutionally 
 
50 In addition to churches and K-12 religious schools, courts have applied the ministerial exception to a religious 
university and a seminary. See Catholic Univ. of America, 83 F.3d 455; Sw. Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 
277. In concept, there is no reason the exception would not be applicable to a religious charity and religious health 
care provider. See Hollins v. Methodist Healthcare, Inc., 474 F.3d 223 (6th Cir. 2007) (church-related hospital). In 
all instances, however, the employer has to meet the definition of a religious organization that has not secularized, 
and the employee concerned has to meet the definition of a minister. 
51 See NLRB v. St. Louis Christian Home, 663 F.2d 60 (8th Cir. 1981) (upholding NLRB jurisdiction because home 
organized as religious but over the years had secularized); Fike v. United Methodist Children’s Home, 547 F. Supp. 
286 (E.D. Va. 1982), aff’d on other grounds, 709 F.2d 284 (4th Cir. 1983) (children’s home that had abandoned its 
religious purpose lost benefit of ministerial exception). 
52 This is somewhat akin to what is done with the religious employer exemption in § 702(a) of Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964. If challenged, the employer needs to convince a court that it is sufficiently religious to invoke 
the exemption. See Spencer v. World Vision, Inc., 633 F.3d 723, 724 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (developing an 
approach for determining who is a seriously religious organization and thus able to invoke the religious employer 
exemption in Title VII); LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Community Center, 503 F.3d 217, 226-29 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(same). 
53 The rule against civil authorities taking up religious disputes is discussed infra Part II.B. 
54 See Bethany College and Thomas Jorsch and Lisa Guinn, 369 NLRB 1 (No. 98, June 10, 2020). 
55 Id. at 2-3. 
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entangling.56 To avoid transgressing the rule against civil authorities resolving religious 
questions, the NLRB’s new three-part inquiry looks only to whether a college: (1) was formed as 
a nonprofit religious corporation or similar entity; (2) currently holds itself out to the public as 
religious; and (3) is affiliated with a church, denomination, or a defined body of creedal or 
religious teachings.57 These three findings are mere factual inquiries about a religious institution 
(i.e., its objective characteristics) and thus can be noted by civil authorities without entangling 
the state in internal religious disputes. 
The ministerial exception was first recognized in the early 1970s by the federal courts of 
appeal in claims brought by clerics alleging employment discrimination by their churches.58 
Because there was no split in the circuits, the U.S. Supreme Court did not get around to affirming 
the ministerial exception until decades later in Hosanna-Tabor.59 In that case, the Court 
ultimately determined that an elementary school teacher was a minister for purposes of the 
exception. However, before taking up that question, Chief Justice John Roberts—writing for the 
Court—had to distinguish Employment Division v. Smith.60 In Smith, the state of Oregon had 
listed peyote, a hallucinogenic, as one of several controlled substances and criminalized its use. 
The plaintiffs in Smith were Native Americans who had been employed as counselors at a private 
drug rehabilitation center.61 They were fired for illegal drug use after supervisors learned they 
ingested peyote as part of a religious ceremony. They were later denied unemployment 
compensation by the state because they were dismissed for cause. The Smith Court held that the 
Free Exercise Clause was not implicated where Oregon enacted a generally applicable drug law 
that was neutral as to religion, even though the law happened to burden the religious use of 
peyote. 
 
56 Colo. Christian Univ. v. Weaver, 534 F.3d 1245, 1265 (10th Cir. 2008) (ruling that “pervasively religious” test 
was unconstitutionally entangling); see Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 739, 828 (2000) (plurality op.) (statutory 
exemption unconstitutionally requires state officials to go illicitly “trolling through a person’s or institution’s 
religious beliefs”). 
57 Bethany College, 369 NLRB at 3-4. 
58 The first federal court of appeals to recognize—as well as name—the ministerial exception was McClure v. 
Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 558 (5th Cir. 1972). See Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 188 n.2 (briefly tracing 
development of ministerial exception in lower courts). 
59 Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 188. 
60 494 U.S. 872. Smith’s “generally applicable” test was recently narrowed in Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. 
Ct. 1868. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. But Fulton does not alter the way Hosanna-Tabor distinguished 
the Smith line of free-exercise cases and therefore not applicable to a church autonomy case like Hosanna-Tabor. 
61 Smith, 494 U.S. at 874. 
15 
 
Chief Justice Roberts admitted that the Americans with Disability Act (ADA) was a 
neutral law of general applicability that happened to have an adverse effect on the Lutheran 
school’s personnel decisions.62 But he then drew a distinction: “The present case, in contrast [to 
Smith], concerns government interference with an internal church decision that affects the faith 
and mission of the church itself.”63 A civil court rendering a judgment in such a case would be 
commanding a church to employ a minister—just like the behavior of a state with an established 
church. Thus, there is a class of cases to which the rule in Smith does not apply: those involving 
decisions within a church’s sphere of internal governance. The Court’s putting aside Smith as 
inapplicable confirms that church autonomy doctrine gives rise to a third line of cases separate 
from the line involving personal religious rights protected by the Free Exercise Clause, as well as 
separate from the Establishment Clause lines of precedent that challenge religious preferences or 
government funding of faith-related organizations.64 
A peyote sacrament is obviously an important religious practice, and the Smith plaintiffs 
suffered a material burden on a Native American religious observance that was unrelieved 
because of the interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause in Smith. But the purpose of church 
autonomy is not to lift personal religious burdens as such. If it were, then Hosanna-Tabor would 
have been directly at odds with Smith and thereby overruled it. That did not happen. Rather, 
Hosanna-Tabor distinguished Smith. Hosanna-Tabor was about the government’s intrusion into 
the zone of internal governance of the religious school—a church autonomy case. Moreover, 
these protected acts of internal self-governance need not be religiously motivated. As the 
Hosanna-Tabor Court observed, “[t]he purpose of the exception is not to safeguard a church’s 
decision to fire a minister only when it is made for a religious reason.”65 Rather, the purpose of 
church autonomy is to set aside the five subject matters that comprise the zone of internal 
governance and keep them autonomous from civil government. Our Lady presented the same 
issue. The teachers pointed out that they were not being dismissed for religious reasons. But with 
the defense of church autonomy, it made no difference that the reasons were secular, as the Court 
pointed out with this illustration: 
 
62 Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 189-90. 
63 Id. at 190. 
64 See supra notes 3-11 and accompanying text. 
65 565 U.S. at 194. 
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Think of the quintessential case where a church wants to dismiss the minister for 
poor performance. The church’s objection in that situation is not that the minister 
has gone over to some other faith but simply that the minister is failing to perform 
essential functions in a satisfactory manner.66 
What matters is not religious injury as such, but that the actions of the employer fall 
within one of the five autonomous subject matters. 
The difference in the nature of the injury that flows from rights-based claims as opposed 
to structural claims can be seen by contrasting the Supreme Court’s Free Exercise Clause cases 
with its Establishment Clause decisions. The Free Exercise Clause is rights-based, and thus the 
only injury it can remedy is a religious injury. In contrast, the Establishment Clause is structural, 
separating two centers of authority, and the court in maintaining this church-state structure will 
redress both religious and nonreligious injuries. Examples of the latter are economic harm in the 
form of increased labor costs or loss of a liquor license,67 loss of academic freedom,68 and 
freedom of thought for atheists.69 Because the doctrine of church autonomy, like the 
Establishment Clause, is structural, it should come as no surprise that the doctrine gives redress 
for both religious and secular injuries. In Hosanna-Tabor, immunity from liability for 
employment discrimination and retaliation was a form of shielding from interference with 
internal governance. 
In Hosanna-Tabor, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission—which intervened 
on behalf of the teacher—claimed that there was no ministerial exception because the First 
Amendment did not require one. All that was required, argued the EEOC, was that the 
 
66 141 S. Ct. at 2068. 
67 See Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985) (upholding claim of department store against labor 
law); Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982) (upholding claim of tavern seeking issuance of a liquor 
license); cf. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 430-31 (1961) (permitting claim of economic harm by retail 
stores to be free of Sunday-closing law, but ultimately ruling against the stores on the merits); Two Guys from 
Harrison Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961) (same). 
68 See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (striking down a state law that required teaching of creation in 
public school science classes if evolution is taught); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (striking down a 
state prohibition on teaching evolution in public school science classes). 
69 See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961). In Torcaso, an atheist who otherwise qualified for a public office 
refused to take a required oath that professed belief in God. The Court held the oath requirement violative of the 
First Amendment without specifying either religion clause. If an individual objects to the oath out of a religious 
belief that forbids taking oaths, then he has a valid claim under the Free Exercise Clause. As an atheist, however, the 
claimant in Torcaso did not suffer a religious injury as he professed to have no religious beliefs. Nevertheless, for a 
state to mandate taking of the oath would be a violation of the Establishment Clause as to all office seekers, 
including atheists, because confession of belief in a deity is a subject that remains in the realm of religion. 
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government be formally neutral with respect to religion and religious organizations. That was the 
case here, said the EEOC, because the ADA treats religious organizations just like every other 
employer when it comes to discrimination on the basis of disability. The agency argued that the 
same was true of federal and state civil rights statutes prohibiting discrimination with respect to 
other protected classes. The EEOC allowed that religious organizations had freedom of 
expressive association, but so did labor unions and service clubs, and they were still subject to 
the ADA.70 Equality was the only requirement, argued the EEOC. The nondiscrimination 
statutes could be blind to religion and religious organizations and still not violate the First 
Amendment. Accordingly, while Congress could choose to accommodate religion when enacting 
legislation, maintained the EEOC, the First Amendment did not require it to do so. 
The Court reacted to the EEOC’s argument for a religion-blind Constitution by calling it 
“remarkable,” “untenable,” and “hard to square with the text of the First Amendment itself, 
which gives special solicitude to the rights of religious organizations.”71 The text of the First 
Amendment recognizes the status of organized religion as more than a mere voluntary 
association vested with the aggregate rights of its individual members. Church autonomy 
doctrine recognizes that a properly conceived structuring of church and state is to the benefit of 
both.72 Accordingly, the Hosanna-Tabor Court regarded the ministerial exception as a defense in 
the nature of an immunity.73 
Downstream of Hosanna-Tabor, a good part of the litigation has focused on the scope of 
the definition of “minister” for purposes of the immunity. That was the situation in Our Lady,74 
where the High Court focused on ensuring that the ministerial exception not be woodenly 
 
70 Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 188-89. 
71 Id. The Court wrote: 
We find [the EEOC] position [on this point] untenable. The right to freedom of association is a right 
enjoyed by religious and secular groups alike. It follows under the EEOC’s . . . view that the First 
Amendment analysis should be the same, whether the association in question is the Lutheran church, 
a labor union or a social club . . . . That result is hard to square with the text of the First Amendment 
itself, which gives special solicitude to the rights of religious organizations. We cannot accept the 
remarkable view that the Religion Clauses have nothing to say about a religious organization’s 
freedom to select its own ministers. 
Id. at 189. 
72 See, e.g., McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948) (“[T]he First Amendment rests upon the 
premise that both religion and government can best work to achieve their lofty aims if each is left free from the other 
within its respective sphere.”); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962) (The Establishment Clause’s “first and 
most immediate purpose rested on the belief that a union of government and religion tends to destroy government 
and to degrade religion.”). 
73 Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 188-90, 195 n.4. 
74 140 S. Ct. 2049. 
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defined. The Ninth Circuit in Our Lady had read narrowly the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Hosanna-Tabor concerning who is a minister. Hosanna-Tabor had found that a fourth-grade 
teacher, Cheryl Perich, was a minister, and that for reasons of church autonomy her claim should 
be dismissed. By taking classes in theology, Perich had earned a lay religious title conferred by 
her denomination. She went on to hold herself out as a minister in recognition of her completed 
coursework and lay title, and she claimed an income tax advantage available only to ministers. 
Perich was not a local church officer, worship leader, or denominational executive, but on the 
whole her duties reflected a key role in transmitting the Lutheran faith to her students.75 
When addressing the breadth of the ministerial exception, the Ninth Circuit in Our Lady 
had treated the facts leading to the determination that Perich was a minister as four requirements 
on a checklist.76 The High Court reversed. Writing for a 7-2 majority, Justice Samuel Alito 
began by noting that the ministerial exception is a subpart of the “general principle of church 
autonomy” that relies on both the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses.77 The Court said: 
The independence of religious institutions in matters of faith and doctrine is closely 
linked to independence in what we have termed “matters of church government.” . 
. . This does not mean that religious institutions enjoy a general immunity from 
secular laws, but it does protect their autonomy with respect to internal management 
decisions that are essential to the institution’s central mission. And a component of 
this autonomy is the selection of the individuals who play certain key roles. 
   . . . Under this rule, courts are bound to stay out of employment disputes involving 
those holding certain important positions with churches and other religious 
institutions. . . . [A] wayward minister’s preaching, teaching, and counseling could 
contradict the church’s tenets and lead the congregation away from the faith. The 
ministerial exception was recognized to preserve a church’s independent authority 
in such matters.78 
The Our Lady Court went on to find that the two classroom teachers at Catholic elementary 
schools in California were ministers for purposes of the immunity. Their claims alleged 
employment discrimination on the basis of age and disability, respectively, when their annual 
 
75 Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 191-94. 
76 140 S. Ct. at 2066-67. 
77 Id. at 2060 (quoting Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 186). 
78 Id. at 2060-61 (citations, internal quotations, and footnotes omitted). 
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employment contracts were not renewed. The nonrenewal was said by the schools to be based on 
poor performance and not acquiring new skills—what you might call “secular” reasons.79 But the 
application of the ministerial exception did not hinge on the schools having a religious reason for 
severing the employment. This makes sense because what is protected by church autonomy 
doctrine is a sphere of “autonomy with respect to internal management decisions that are 
essential to the institution’s central mission” (whether that decision be characterized as secular or 
religious), not a personal right of religious liberty vested in the employer.80 
The Court admitted that it would have been easier to find that the elementary teachers 
were ministers if they had satisfied all of the four items that had been present in Hosanna-Tabor. 
But Our Lady held that none of those items was essential.81 What matters are the actual job 
functions of the employee.82 The two classroom teachers had duties that were explicitly 
religious. They taught classes in Catholic doctrine, led their students in classroom prayer and 
recitation of Christian creeds, accompanied the students to a weekly mass, and signed annual 
employment contracts that set forth the religious mission of the school and required that they 
pledge to do nothing to undermine it.83 By the employment contract, the teachers “were also 
expected to guide their students, by word and deed, toward the goal of living their lives in 
accordance with the faith.”84 Moreover, so long as some of their employment functions were 
explicitly religious, it did not matter how much clock time the religious functions comprise in the 
teacher’s overall school day.85 For example, the explicitly religious functions could have 
comprised only 10 percent of a 40-hour workweek. And the institutions here were K-12 religious 
schools, which are viewed by the church as integral to passing on the Catholic faith to the next 
generation.86 When “a school with a religious mission entrusts a teacher with the responsibility 
of educating and forming students in the faith, judicial intervention into disputes between the 
school and the teacher threatens the school’s independence in a way that the First Amendment 
does not allow.”87 
 
79 Id. at 2058, 2059. 
80 Id. at 2060. 
81 Id. at 2062, 2063. 
82 Id. at 2064. 
83 Id. at 2056-60. 
84 Id. at 2066. 
85 Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 193-94 (the question of who is a minister is not resolved by a stopwatch). 
86 Our Lady, 140 S. Ct. at 2065-66 (noting the importance of religious schools to Puritans, Jews, Muslims, 
Mormons, and Seventh-day Adventists). 
87 Id. at 2069. 
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When considering whether the ministerial exception applies, rather than inquiring 
whether the employee is a minister in the ordinary sense of that term (e.g., pastor, priest, rabbi, 
imam, and so on), the Court asks one of two questions: (1) At some point in the workweek, does 
the employee perform some explicitly religious function, as was the case in Our Lady and 
Hosanna-Tabor? (2) Does the employee hold a position of executive leadership or have a role in 
leading worship or ritual?88 If the answer to either question is in the affirmative, then the 
immunity applies. 
In the fact-finding necessary to determine if an employee meets the definition of a 
minister, the civil courts cannot get entangled in deciding whether certain employee tasks are 
religiously important or meaningful as opposed to religiously peripheral or minor.89 Justice 
Alito, writing for the Court in Our Lady, made a point of warning that this sort of judicial 
entanglement in religious questions had long been unconstitutional.90 Justice Clarence Thomas 
filed a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Neil Gorsuch, stating that the determination as to 
who is a minister ought to be unilaterally decided by the religious employer to avoid having 
courts delve into prohibited religious questions.91 Justice Alito, for the Court, did not go that far. 
The determination remains a question for the civil courts. Nevertheless, the Court’s approach 
was highly deferential to the two Catholic schools regarding the employers’ view that some of 
the teachers’ job functions were religious.92 Justice Alito noted the explicitly religious functions 
of the teachers here: teaching the Catholic religion, leading students in prayer and devotionals, 
 
88 Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 188, 196. 
89 See infra Part II.B. 
90 Our Lady, 140 S. Ct. at 2063 n.10. 
91 Id. at 2069-71 (Thomas. J., concurring, joined by Justice Gorsuch). Justice Thomas made the same argument in 
Hosanna-Tabor. 565 U.S. at 196-98 (Thomas, J., concurring). There are problems with Justice Thomas’ suggestion. 
He would leave the question of who is a minister to be unilaterally determined by the defendant/employer. The lack 
of checks and balances invites exaggerated claims with respect to a dispositive defense. Even more fundamentally, 
church autonomy is ranked by the positive law as a categorical immunity higher than all other defenses. But it is 
nonetheless a rule subject to the positive law, not above the law. 
92 Our Lady, 140 S. Ct at 2066-69. There is no attempt in this article to catalogue all of the developing, sometimes 
contradictory, lower court cases as to who is found to be a “minister” for purposes of the defense. See, e.g., Sw. 
Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277, cert. denied, 456 U.S. 905 (1982) (finding faculty and administrators 
were “ministers” for purposes of the ministerial exception); InterVarsity Christian Fellowship/USA, 2021 WL 
1387787 (state university cannot control the qualifications of leaders of campus religious student organization 
because they are “ministers” subject to the ministerial exception); Simon, 2021 WL 1660851 (citing ministerial 
exception as reason to dismiss claims for employment discrimination and whistleblowing brought by individual who 
was chair of religion department and campus chaplain at Catholic college); Maxon v. Fuller Theological Seminary, 
2020 U.S. Dist. Lexis 202309 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2020) (on appeal to Ninth Circuit) (ministerial exception applies to 




and attending mass with the students. These tasks, of course, are widely recognized to be 
explicitly religious practices for Christians. As to other religions, as well as other types of 
religious organizations besides churches (e.g., colleges, health clinics, and welfare providers), 
Justice Alito appealed to religious employers to make it clear in advance (perhaps in an 
employment contract or employee handbook) which employees perform what the employer 
considers to be explicitly religious functions: 
In a country with the religious diversity of the United States, judges cannot be 
expected to have a complete understanding and appreciation of the role played by 
every person who performs a particular role in every religious tradition. A religious 
institution’s explanation of the role of such employees in the life of the religion in 
question is important.93 
The conundrum over who ultimately decides who is a minister is, as noted by Justice Thomas, 
not entirely resolved by the Court’s opinion in Our Lady. 
Looking for ways to circumvent Hosanna-Tabor and Our Lady, counsel for plaintiffs 
have sought to distinguish claims of discrimination in hiring, promotion, and dismissal from 
claims of hostile or harassing conditions of employment.94 Plaintiffs have also resorted to filing 
claims arising out of the employment relationship that sound in tort or breach of contract.95 For 
the most part, claims based on these theories have also been dismissed for reasons of church 
autonomy.96 Occasionally added to these unsuccessful common-law actions are a count under a 
 
93 Our Lady, 140 S. Ct. at 2066. 
94 See Demkovich v. Saint Andrew the Apostle Par., Calumet City, 3 F.4th 968 (7th Cir. 2021) (en banc) (holding 
that the ministerial exception does apply to employment discrimination claim alleging hostile work environment or 
sexual harassment); Skrzypczak v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Tulsa, 611 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 2010) (same). A 
contrary result was reached in Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951 (9th Cir. 2004). 
95 But see Sumner v. Simpson Univ., 27 Cal. App. 5th 577 (2018) (holding that claims for torts brought against 
seminary for dismissal of individual who was dean and member of the faculty were not subject to ministerial 
exception, but not claims for breach of contract). The dean and member of the faculty was properly regarded as a 
minister for purposes of the ministerial exception and the Christian college properly regarded as a religious entity. 
The breach of contract claim was said to entail the litigation of only secular questions. But with defense of church 
autonomy, the secularity of the tort and contract issues makes no difference. See supra notes 70-80, and infra notes 
193-94, 203-04 and accompanying text. If the subject matter of the dispute falls within one of the five zones of what 
the Supreme Court has identified as “internal governance,” then the claim is barred. Here, the dismissal of the dean 
of a seminary falls within the subject area of the terms and conditions of the employment of a minister and should be 
prohibited. And the elements of the torts were part and parcel of the alleged discrimination. 
96 See, e.g., Bell v. Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), 126 F.3d 328 (4th Cir. 1997) (dismissing action by pastor who 
sued denomination, by which he was not employed, alleging state law tort claims for, among other things, tortious 
interference and intentional infliction of emotional distress); Hutchison v. Thomas, 789 F.2d 392 (6th Cir. 1986) 
(rejecting “neutral principles of law” exception to church autonomy doctrine as applied to state law tort claims, 
including defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress, against the church in challenge to forced 
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state whistleblower statute, also unsuccessful.97 The dismissals are proper.98 What ought to 
matter concerning the applicability of the ministerial exception is not legal counsel for plaintiffs 
selecting just the right civil writ to pursue an employment grievance—be it the law of torts, 
contracts, property, or implied trust. That sort of 19th century, writ-bound thinking has long been 
abandoned in the law of pleading and preclusion, and it has no place in the First Amendment. As 
a defense of constitutional scope, church autonomy necessarily bars these tort and contract suits 
if proving the elements of the prima facie claim (or various expected defenses) would give rise to 
questions that intrude into the employer’s internal governance, including the determination of 
doctrine or polity, the prudent supervision of ministers, the dismissal of members and affiliates, 
or internal communications about these matters. 
Not every tort, contract, or whistleblower claim arising out of an employment 
relationship involving a religious employer will be barred by church autonomy.99 Rather, the 
trial court should make findings concerning whether entertaining a common-law claim will 
invade one of the five protected subject matters that the Supreme Court has deemed out-of-
bounds to civil authorities as a matter of internal governance. 
B. “The Law Knows No Heresy”: The Rule Against Deciding Religious Questions 
Church autonomy doctrine has long entailed the rule that the judiciary must avoid issues 
that cause it to probe into the religious meaning of religious words, practices, or events,100 and 
 
retirement); Kaufman v. Sheehan, 707 F.2d 355 (8th Cir. 1983) (holding that employment suit by priest filed under 
theory of breach of employment contract was subject to First Amendment ministerial exception); Erdman v. Chapel 
Hill Presbyterian Church, 286 P.3d 357 (Wash. 2012) (en banc) (rejecting “neutral principles of law” exception to 
church autonomy in state tort claim related to ministerial employment). 
97 See Rehfield, 2021 IL 125656 (dismissing whistleblower claim by former ministerial employee filed along with 
statutory civil rights counts alleging employment discrimination); Simon, 2021 WL 1660851 (citing ministerial 
exception as reason to dismiss claims for employment discrimination and whistleblowing brought by individual who 
was chair of religion department and campus chaplain at Catholic college). 
98 See generally Victor E. Schwartz & Christopher E. Appel, The Church Immunity Doctrine: Where Tort Law 
Should Step Aside, 80 U. CINN. L. REV. 431 (2011). 
99 Our Lady, 140 S. Ct. at 2060 (“That does not mean that religious institutions enjoy a general immunity from 
secular laws, but it does protect their autonomy with respect to internal management decisions that are essential to 
the institution’s central mission.”); Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 196 (“Today we hold only that the ministerial 
exception bars [antidiscrimination civil rights suits.] We express no view on whether the exception bars other types 
of suits, including actions by employees alleging breach of contract or tortious conduct by their religious employers. 
There will be time enough to address the applicability of the exception to other circumstances if and when they 
arise.”). 
100 See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of UVA, 515 U.S. 819, 843-44 (1995) (state university must avoid 
distinguishing between evangelism, on the one hand, and the expression of ideas merely approved by a given 
religion); Bob Jones University v. U.S. 461 U.S. 574, 604 n.30 (1983) (avoiding potentially entangling inquiry into 
religious practice); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269-70 n.6, 272 n.11 (1981) (holding that inquiries into 
religious significance of words or events are to be avoided); Thomas, 450 U.S. at 715-16 (not within judicial 
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that it must avoid making determinations concerning the centrality of a religious belief or 
practice to that religion.101 Often referred to as the “religious question doctrine,” the rule bars the 
judiciary—indeed all civil officials and authorities—from attempting to resolve disputes over the 
orthodoxy of what a person or organization professes, and from taking up any question as to the 
validity, meaning, or importance of a religious belief or practice. To the law it makes no 
difference if a religious liberty claimant is uncertain about or questioning her beliefs, if she is a 
new convert, or if she is not a part of any organized church or denomination.102 As the Court 
pronounced in Watson, “The law knows no heresy, and is committed to the support of no dogma, 
the establishment of no sect.”103 The purpose of the rule is to keep the government from picking 
sides concerning a religious matter—a purpose rooted in the Establishment Clause—as well as to 
not deter a person’s free exercise of religion. 
The most frequently cited case for the rule is Thomas v. Review Board.104 In Thomas, a 
state sought to defeat a former employee’s Free Exercise Clause claim challenging the 
government’s denial of unemployment compensation. Thomas was laid off from a factory when 
he refused to work on parts for military tanks because he was a religious pacifist. By using the 
 
function or competence to resolve religious differences); Gillette v. U.S., 401 U.S. 437, 450 (1971) (Congress 
permitted to accommodate “all war” but not “just war” pacifists because to broaden the exemption invites increased 
church-state entanglements and would render almost impossible the fair and uniform administration of selective 
service system); Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970) (courts should avoid entanglement that would 
follow should tax authorities evaluate the temporal worth of religious social welfare programs); Cantwell v. 
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 305-07 (1940) (ruling that petty officials may not to be given discretion to determine 
what is a legitimate “religion” for purposes of issuing permit); see also Rusk v. Espinosa, 456 U.S. 951 (1982) (aff’d 
mem.) (striking down charitable solicitation ordinance that required government officials to distinguish between 
“spiritual” and secular purposes underlying solicitation by religious organizations). 
101 See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 451 (1988) (rejecting free exercise test 
that “depend[s] on measuring the effects of a governmental action on a religious objector’s spiritual development”); 
Amos, 483 U.S. at 336 (recognizing a problem when government attempts to divine which jobs are sufficiently 
related to the core of a religious organization so as to merit exemption from statutory duties is desirable); United 
States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257 (1982) (rejecting government’s argument that free exercise claim does not lie 
unless “payment of social security taxes will . . . threaten the integrity of the Amish religious belief or observance”); 
Smith, 494 U.S. at 886-87 (same). 
102 See Frazee v. Illinois Dep’t of Empl. Security, 489 U.S. 829 (1989) (state could not withhold unemployment 
compensation from Sabbath observer because he was not a member of any church). 
103 80 U.S. at 728. 
104 450 U.S. 707 (1981). For example, Our Lady relied on Thomas. Our Lady, 140 S. Ct. at 2063 n.10. It also relied 
on Presbyterian Church, where the Court said courts must avoid “resolving underlying controversies over religious 
doctrine,” and that “First Amendment values are plainly jeopardized when . . . litigation is made to turn on the 
resolution by civil courts of controversies over religious doctrine and practice.” Id. at 2063 n.10 (citing Presbyterian 
Church, 393 U.S. at 449). It also relied on Milivojevich. Id. at 2063 n.10 (citing Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 715 n.8) 
(“It is not to be supposed that the judges of the civil courts can be as competent in the ecclesiastical law and 
religious faith of all these bodies as the ablest men in each are in reference to their own.”) (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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testimony of a co-worker, who was also a longtime member of the same religion as Thomas, the 
state sought to show that Thomas, as a new convert, was misapplying the teachings of his 
church. The Supreme Court would have none of it, observing that Thomas “drew a line” 
concerning his beliefs that the state had to accept, lest the civil courts become “arbiters of 
scriptural interpretation.”105 
Thomas was a cause of action brought by an individual religious claimant rather than a 
lawsuit attempting to vindicate the autonomy of a church. Thus, it might seem odd to regard the 
precedent as a leading case for the application of church autonomy. The main underlying cause 
of action was about whether Thomas had a successful entitlement claim under the Free Exercise 
Clause, which the Court eventually held that he did. However, application of the church 
autonomy doctrine in Thomas arose out of an ancillary issue—whether the state’s expert 
testimony went to a religious question the Court could not properly consider.  
The prohibition on civil courts taking up religious issues or disputes frequently is an 
important reason for rejecting an argument raised by a party opposing a religious claimant. For 
example, in Our Lady the teachers in the Catholic elementary schools argued that they could not 
be ministers for purposes of the ministerial exception unless as a condition of employment they 
were required to be Catholic, like the sponsoring schools. The Court rejected the suggestion 
because civil judges cannot determine when an employee is a co-religionist with the employer. Is 
an Orthodox Jew a co-religionist with a Conservative Jewish employer? Is a Southern Baptist 
teacher seeking employment at a Primitive Baptist school applying to work for a co-religionist? 
For a civil magistrate to have the final say as to who is a co-religionist to the employer violates 
the ban on religious questions.106 Our Lady further rejected the co-religionist criterion because a 
civil court would have no way of independently determining whether an employee remained in 
good standing with her church (thus still a co-religionist) without transgressing the rule against 
religious questions. Is a teacher who says she is Catholic to be regarded by a court as a Catholic 
in good standing when she attends mass only on Easter and Christmas and favors women’s 
reproductive rights?107 
 
105 450 U.S. at 715, 716. Thomas was a Jehovah’s Witness. He believed his religion prohibited him from working in 
a factory on the task of fabricating turrets for military tanks. Id. at 710. 
106 Our Lady, 140 S. Ct. at 2068-69 (quoting petitioners’ reply brief). 
107 Id. at 2069. 
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The Court rejected a similar line of argument in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,108 
where the government opposed application of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act109 to the 
“contraceptive mandate” for employers subject to the Affordable Care Act. Government lawyers 
argued that the complicity in evil-doing claimed by Hobby Lobby as a result of the contraceptive 
mandate was too attenuated to constitute a substantial religious burden. The Court rejected the 
government’s attenuation argument because a civil court would have no way of determining if 
the employer’s claim of complicity in evil-doing was central or peripheral to the employer’s 
religious faith without violating the rule prohibiting religious questions.110 
In NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago,111 the rule prohibiting religious questions helped 
to prevent a religious K-12 school from being subjected to mandatory collective bargaining 
under the National Labor Relations Act.112 The Court painted a picture of church-state 
entanglements that could arise if ecclesiastical authorities operating a school were forced to 
answer to charges of unfair labor practices.113 The specter was of a bishop or mother superior 
being harshly examined by an administrative law judge concerning his or her truthfulness when 
characterizing as religious the educational policy being challenged by the union representing lay 
teachers. This is another way of saying that government-supervised collective bargaining would 
frequently call for the administrative resolution of religious disputes. The NLRA had no statutory 
exemption for religious organizations, including religious schools. Yet by adopting a rule of 
statutory construction that presumes religious organizations are exempt from congressional 
regulatory statutes that would otherwise entangle the government in matters of internal religious 
governance, the Court held that the NLRA did not apply to these schools.114 The result is best 
explained by the church autonomy doctrine. 
 
108 573 U.S. 682 (2014). See Alexander MacDonald, Religious Schools, Collective Bargaining, & the Constitutional 
Legacy of NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 22 FEDERALIST SOC’Y REV. 134 (2021) (noting that while federal NLRB 
continues to not organize lay faculty at religious schools, some states have moved into the regulatory vacuum). 
109 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4. 
110 Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 729 n.37. 
111 440 U.S. 490. 
112 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 to 169. 
113 Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 496, 498-99, 501-04. 
114 Id. at 504-07. See also Duquesne Univ. of the Holy Spirit v. NLRB, 947 F.3d 824 (D.C. Cir. 2020); Univ. of 
Great Falls v. NLRB, 278 F.3d 1335 (D.C. Cir. 2002). These cases are best understood as applications of the rule 
prohibiting civil authorities taking up religious questions. 
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Similarly, some tort claims against a church necessarily raise forbidden religious 
questions for resolution by the finder of fact, often a jury.115 Perhaps the most novel line of tort 
claims to be impacted by church autonomy doctrine is the bitter struggle surrounding the theory 
of clergy malpractice. Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley concerned the 
relationship between a local church and one of its members.116 For several years, Kenneth Nally 
regularly attended worship services at Grace Community Church, a nondenominational 
Protestant congregation, and was involved in additional midweek church activities. He willingly 
sought spiritual counseling by the pastoral staff that was provided at no cost. Kenneth had long 
suffered from depression, and in 1979, he committed suicide at the age of 24. The following 
year, his parents filed a wrongful death suit against the church and four members of the pastoral 
staff. The complaint alleged three theories of relief: clergy malpractice in pastoral counseling and 
teaching; negligence in the training of the pastoral staff to perform the spiritual counseling; and 
outrageous conduct in allegedly dissuading Kenneth from turning to his family and their Catholic 
upbringing to address his depression and suicidal tendencies. After protracted discovery and 
pretrial motions, the case was dismissed by the trial court citing uncontested facts that 
undermined central allegations in the parents’ pleading, but also by relying on First Amendment 
safeguards for church operations. The California Court of Appeal, in a split decision, reversed 
and remanded for further discovery and trial.117 
On remand and three weeks into a trial before a jury, the judge granted defendants’ 
motion for a nonsuit on all three counts in the complaint.118 The claims were dismissed for both 
factual and legal reasons, one prominent rationale being the defenses available under the First 
Amendment.119 Nally’s parents again appealed, and the Court of Appeal again reversed. It held 
that although the clergy malpractice count failed to state a cause of action separate from the 
negligence count, both legal theories could be construed as stating a cause of action for the 
 
115 For a collection of tort claims raising First Amendment defenses, including the defense of church autonomy, see 
Carl H. Esbeck, Tort Claims Against Churches and Ecclesiastical Officers: The First Amendment Considerations, 
89 W.VA. L. REV. 1, 76-113 (1986). 
116 For a fuller account of the Nally litigation, see id. at 78-84. 
117 Nally v. Grace Cmty. Church of the Valley, 157 Cal. App. 3d 912 (1984). Following the Court of Appeal’s 
decision, the defendants petitioned the California Supreme Court for review. Review was denied and the case 
remanded for further proceedings before the trial court, but the Court of Appeals’ opinion was ordered depublished. 
118 Memo. op., No. NCC 18668-B (Cal. Super. Ct., Los Angeles County, May 1985). A nonsuit meant that the claim 
had no legal or factual basis. 
119 Nally, 157 Cal. App. 3d 912. 
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“negligent failure to prevent suicide” by the church’s “non-therapist counselors.” The First 
Amendment defenses were brushed aside. 
On review by the California Supreme Court, it held that the trial court had correctly 
granted a nonsuit as to all three counts in the complaint.120 The high court thought that neither 
the evidence adduced at trial nor well-established principles of tort law supported the Court of 
Appeal’s reversal of the nonsuit. The holding was based on the facts and state tort law. 
Accordingly, the California Supreme Court said it need not address the First Amendment issues 
raised by the church and its four pastors. A final appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court was 
summarily turned away,121 a result virtually assured because final disposition by the state 
supreme court was grounded in state law, not federal First Amendment issues. 
At one level, the church and its pastoral staff were vindicated as the dispute ended 
entirely in their favor. But the basis for that resolution was not entirely satisfactory because the 
appellate courts lost an opportunity for a valuable teaching on the First Amendment. 
Nevertheless, the ten-year struggle in California widely exposed and deeply tainted the theory of 
clergy malpractice. As a consequence, when the theory was tried in other states, the courts 
rejected it—this time, for the right reason.122 A claim for clergy malpractice assumes a uniform 
and regulated profession with objective, temporal standards of care against which an alleged 
failure of legal duty can be measured. That is not possible when the offices of clergy are as 
differentiated as those of rabbi, priest, pastor, and imam. Accordingly, the plaintiffs sought to 
have the law of torts impose a uniform standard of care on all clergy, as is the case with suits for 
medical, legal, and other types of malpractice. But for a common-law judge to impose a uniform 
standard of clerical practice is an obvious form of religious establishment—choosing one set of 
religious practices over others. The claim of ordinary negligence fares no better. In litigating the 
duty of due care or asking what constitutes “the reasonably prudent cleric,” a civil court—often 
with a jury as fact finder—will find itself probing the spiritual duties of an ecclesiastical office 
 
120 Nally v. Grace Cmty. Church of the Valley, 763 P.2d 948 (1988). 
121 Nally v. Grace Cmty. Church of the Valley, 490 U.S. 1007 (1989). 
122 See, e.g., Franco v. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 21 P.3d 198 (Utah 2001) (dismissing tort 
claims including clergy malpractice brought by parishioner and her parents against church for advice given by 
ecclesiastic); Langford v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, 271 App. Div. 2d 494, 705 N.Y.S.2d 661 (2000) 
(dismissing various tort claims brought by parishioner against priest and diocese for sexual relationship that 
occurred during counselling by priest); Bladen v. First Presbyterian Church of Sallisaw, 857 P.2d 789 (Okla. 1993) 
(dismissing tort claims including clergy malpractice brought against church by husband who had received marital 
counseling from his pastor who was at the time having affair with husband’s wife). 
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and facing differing (sometimes conflicting) interpretations of scripture, doctrine, and religious 
tradition. This violates the prohibition on civil authorities resolving religious questions. Further, 
such findings—even assuming they can be established on a case-by-case basis—will yield a 
standard of care that varies from church to church. To avoid this conclusion, the plaintiffs in 
Nally sought to import secular standards from the profession of clinical licensed counselors. 
However, not only were these secular standards an alien imposition on the office of clerics 
attuned to providing spiritual advice, but the secular principles and methods could conflict with 
the church’s teachings—a free exercise burden. 
Over time, the rule prohibiting a state from resolving religious disputes has become 
identified with what judges and lawyers refer to when they caution the government against 
untoward “entanglements” between church and state. The same concept is behind the judicial 
praise offered for legislative or regulatory exemptions that thereby successfully avoid such 
entanglements. It was in Walz v. Tax Commission of New York that the Supreme Court first sang 
the virtues of avoiding entanglement between the institutions of church and state.123 The Walz 
Court considered a property tax exemption for churches, which it not only found to be 
compatible with the Establishment Clause,124 but praiseworthy because it avoided administrative 
entanglements otherwise present in the property appraisals, tax liens, and tax foreclosures that 
attend ad valorem statutes.125 Just one year later, in Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Court fashioned a 
wholly new requirement that governments eschew “excessive entanglement” between church and 
state to avoid violating the Establishment Clause.126 However, in a complex society, a certain 
level of regulatory interaction between church and state is inevitable, even desirable. For 
example, churches can hardly be exempt from building safety codes or most zoning restrictions. 
While the three-part Lemon test is now in disuse,127 for a time there were cases where 
administrative entanglement alone—deemed to be excessive by some measure never 
 
123 397 U.S. 664. 
124 The aspect of the property tax code that was challenged was a religious exemption, not a religious preference. For 
purposes of the Establishment Clause, statutory exemptions are regarded as the legislature choosing to leave religion 
unregulated even as its secular counterparts are regulated. And a state does not establish a religion by leaving it 
alone. Id. at 673. 
 125 Id. at 674, 676. 
126 403 U.S. at 612-13 (“excessive entanglement” elevated to a third prong of test for measuring Establishment 
Clause compliance). 
127 See, e.g., Williams v. Kingdom Hall of Jehovah's Witnesses, 2021 UT 18 (2021) (noting that the U.S. Supreme 
Court no longer applies the Lemon test). 
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quantified—could lead to laws being deemed unconstitutional.128 That unhappy state of affairs 
seems to have gotten sorted out, and excessive entanglement is no longer found to be a stand-
alone violation of the Establishment Clause.129 The idea that regulatory entanglements can 
independently implicate the Establishment Clause has now been narrowed and subsumed into the 
longstanding rule prohibiting courts from answering religious questions. And it is all to the better 
that the word “entanglement” has been repurposed in this way. Judges and lawyers can still refer 
to unconstitutional entanglements (dropping the adjective “excessive”) as a descriptor for when a 
church-state boundary has been crossed, but it is now just a succinct way of describing a failure 
by civil officials to heed the rule against taking up religious questions. 
The rule prohibiting religious questions does not forbid government authorities from 
inquiring into the sincerity of a party asserting a claim or defense of religious freedom.130 As 
difficult as it can be to measure what is in the hearts of people with respect to their religious 
professions, requiring sincerity is a logical necessity. The Religion Clauses must not be allowed 
to become a refuge for fakers, frauds, and charlatans. That said, sincerity is rarely an issue in 
First Amendment claims. In most every case, the government tacitly concedes the claimant’s 
sincerity, but then defends the suit on other grounds. 
The scope of the religious question rule also leaves room for the government to make 
limited inquiries about a religion. At its most elemental level, this is the government simply 
taking notice that an entity identifies as Catholic rather than Protestant, or that an entity is a free-
standing religious college rather than a subsidiary of a Protestant denomination. These are factual 
findings that merely take note of a given religion’s beliefs or polity. For example, a civil 
magistrate, following the usual rules of evidence, can determine whether a Jewish community 
center or a Christian international disaster relief organization is a religious employer such that it 
qualifies for an exemption from federal employment antidiscrimination laws.131 It is no invasion 
of church autonomy to ask an employer, claiming to be statutorily exempt because it is religious, 
 
128 Lemon itself held that state programs to aid K-12 religious schools generated excessive entanglement between 
church and state in violation of the Establishment Clause. 403 U.S. at 617-18. 
129 See, e.g., American Legion, 139 S. Ct. 2067, where only one of the seven Justices in the majority used the Lemon 
test. 
130 The leading case on sincerity as necessary to invoking a religious-freedom claim under the First Amendment is 
United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944). 
131 See, e.g., Spencer, 633 F.3d at 724 (developing an approach for determining who is a religious organization and 




to demonstrate that it is organized under state law as a religious corporation, that it continues to 
hold itself out to the public as such, and that it presently engages in religious activities. Such 
findings of fact are permitted because they are inquiries about religion, not about the underlying 
religion’s validity or the religious meaning or importance of its tenets and observances. 
C. Internecine Disputes, Including Litigation Implicating Only Title to Church Property 
The third type of frequently occurring litigation implicating the church autonomy 
doctrine is disputes between two factions within a religious organization as to which is the “true” 
church.132 To begin, the civil courts cannot adjudicate which faction has departed from the 
“correct” doctrine or polity and thus should be denied the organization’s property, for that is a 
prohibited religious question. This would seem to mean that any dispute over the use or 
ownership of church property must be left for resolution by the internal dispute resolution 
processes of the church. And it remains for the civil authorities to step back and defer to the final 
result of those internal processes.133 That is indeed the general rule as dictated by church 
autonomy. In a church of hierarchical polity, the officials at the top are likely to prevail, as we 
see in the leading case of Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich.134 In contrast, in a 
church body of congregational polity, the majority of local voting members will decide the 
matter in question.  
In its line of cases involving internecine disputes, however, the Supreme Court has 
developed an alternative where state authorities resolve the conflict over title to the disputed 
property through state-fashioned “neutral principles of law.” It bears special caution that 
resorting to a rule of neutral principles has been permitted only when the disputing factions have 
abandoned any attempt to remain together as a unified religious entity, leaving for civil 
 
132 In the rare instance where church property has fallen into the possession of parties falsely representing 
themselves as officers of the church so as to obtain control of valuable property, a court may probe just far enough 
to prevent a fraudulent takeover. See Bouldin, 82 U.S. 131 (courts will not go behind stated reasons for 
excommunication of church trustees and members, but a court may determine if their ouster was truly an act of the 
church or a takeover by confederates claiming to have authority to act). 
133 While not common, there are instances where the internal polity of a hierarchical denomination is unclear on 
what is the ecclesial judicatory with final authority to resolve a given factional dispute. If the ecclesiastical 
procedures or canons are unclear on this point, a civil court cannot resolve the dispute without violating the rule 
against religious questions. In such a situation, Justice Brennan suggested that the court resort to neutral principles 
of law. Church at Sharpsburg, 396 U.S. at 369 and n.2 (Brennan, J., concurring). This only seems fair. The 
general church has nobody but itself to blame for its internal dispute resolution system not being deferred to by 
civil authorities. It holds the primary responsibility for clarifying its polity before such disputes arise. A similar 
result would seem to be called for if it is not even clear whether the general church is hierarchical. 
134 426 U.S. 696. 
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resolution only the issue of which faction is to be awarded ownership of the church property. The 
Court has not overtly announced this limitation on the rule, but it is the most straightforward way 
to reconcile the High Court’s cases—and it does the least damage to the doctrine of church 
autonomy. There will follow more discussion on why the neutral-principles alternative is 
permitted in these limited circumstances, but we begin with the general rule. 
The first in this internecine dispute line of cases is Watson v. Jones.135 The Supreme 
Court in Watson laid down the broad principles that apply when federal courts deal with disputes 
within a religious body that implicate doctrine, polity, oversight of ecclesiastics, or the discipline 
of members. To avoid transgressing church autonomy, civil magistrates defer to the dispute 
resolution reached by the church’s highest judicatory: 
[W]henever the questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or 
law have been decided by the highest of these church judicatories to which the 
matter has been carried, the legal tribunals must accept such decisions as final, and 
as binding on them, in their application to the case before them.136 
Watson was a post-Civil War case that involved a struggle in Kentucky between two factions of 
a local Presbyterian church for control of the church building. Title as set forth in the deed to the 
property was in the name of the trustees of the local church. However, the corporate charter of 
the local church “subjected both property and trustees alike to the operation of [the general 
church’s] fundamental laws.”137 The general church or denomination was the Presbyterian 
Church of the United States. Its highest governing body was called the General Assembly. The 
internal operational rules governing the General Assembly stated that it possessed “the power of 
deciding in all controversies respecting doctrine and discipline.”138 
Following the Civil War, the General Assembly had ordered members of all local church 
bodies who believed in a divine basis for slavery to “repent and forsake these sins.”139 In 
Kentucky, a majority of local church members were willing to comply with the directive. A 
minority faction, however, dissented, and it deemed the directive of the Assembly a departure 
from the doctrine held at the time when the local church body first joined with the general 
 
135 80 U.S. 679. 
136 Id. at 727. 
137 Id. at 683. 
138 Id. at 682. 
139 Id. at 691. 
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church. The minority’s legal theory was that the general church held an interest in the local real 
estate that was subject to an implied trust. Further, a condition of the trust was that the church 
adhere to its original doctrines. Any material departure by the general church meant a breach of 
the trust and thus forfeiture of its interest in the property. Accordingly, the minority faction 
claimed that the majority had relinquished any right to ownership of the property when the 
general church repudiated the original, proslavery doctrines. Because they were the “true 
church,” members of the minority faction maintained, they should be awarded title to the local 
real estate.140 
The Supreme Court began by rejecting the implied-trust theory—which originated in 
English law with its established Church of England141—because the departure-from-doctrine 
inquiry would require civil adjudication of a religious question. The Watson Court gave three 
reasons for why it did not have authority to pass judgment on that question: (1) civil judges are 
unschooled in religious doctrine and thereby not competent to resolve disputes concerning 
religious doctrine nor to properly interpret church documents and canon law;142 (2) for the civil 
law to award the property to the faction adhering to original doctrine would entail the 
government taking sides in a religious dispute, thereby “establishing” one creedal position over 
another, while also inhibiting forces for reform in religious doctrine;143 and (3) both clerics and 
lay members of a church have voluntarily joined the entire church, the general as well as the 
local body, thus giving implied consent to the polity of the entire church and its canonical 
administration of disputes. 144 These bases for church autonomy are rooted, said the Court, in 
the American governmental system that—unlike the English system—separates the 
institutions of church and state, thereby sharply limiting the involvement of civil courts in 
the governance of religious bodies.145 
 
140 Id. at 691-94. 
141 Id. at 727-28. 
142 Id. at 729, 730, 732. 
143 Id. at 728, 730, 732. 
144 Id. at 729. 
145 Id. at 728-29, 730. The polity of the church in Watson was presbyterian, and the General Assembly had the final 
say as to some questions—including the doctrinal question that was at issue in the case. An episcopal polity is even 
less democratic, with the final say on most matters lying with the diocesan bishop. In contrast to these hierarchical 
forms of governance, there is the congregational polity where the central characteristic is autonomy in each local 
entity. In such a polity, a majority of the local members resolves disputes in accord with a set of bylaws, hence most 
differences can be settled democratically once a meeting is called, a quorum is present, and bona fide members cast 
their votes. Congregational churches often cooperate with a convention of likeminded local churches, but each local 
body retains it autonomy. While it can be modestly helpful to classify the polity of a denomination or convention as 
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The Supreme Court went on to hold that a local member’s implied consent to be 
governed by the general church’s polity and its officials is sufficient to protect that 
individual’s free-exercise rights, so long as the member has the unilateral  right to leave the 
church at any time.146 Departing from a church, of course, means a cleric or church member 
leaving behind his or her work and ministry, both spiritual and material. But being willing to 
leave behind one’s pas t  works is what is impliedly consented to when one voluntarily joins 
both the church-wide units and a local congregation of a denomination. 
Watson was followed by Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop.147 The issue in 
Gonzalez arose in the Philippines, a U.S. territory at the time, hence there was federal subject 
matter jurisdiction. A dispute arose in the Catholic Church over the authority to fill a clerical 
vacancy. The Supreme Court brushed aside a contrary result based on a rule found in the civil 
law and instead deferred to the church’s power of appointment resting in the archbishop. 
The Watson and Gonzalez principles were elevated to First Amendment stature in 
Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral.148 The Supreme Court in Kedroff struck down a New 
York statute that had recently been adopted to move control of domestic Russian Orthodox 
Churches from the central governing hierarchy located in the Soviet Union to the Diocese of 
North America. The state’s felt need to transfer control of ecclesiastical authority was linked to 
the Marxist Revolution of 1917 and subsequent doubt concerning whether there was in the 
U.S.S.R. “a true central organization of the Russian Orthodox Church capable of functioning as 
the head of a free international religious body.”149 This was the height of the Cold War, and the 
state legislature believed that church officials in Moscow had been coopted by the Communist 
Party. Because the New York statute did more than just “permit the trustees of the Cathedral [in 
New York City] to use it for services consistent with the desires of the [local] members”—but 
transferring control over the denomination’s North American churches by legislative fiat150—the 
Supreme Court held that the statute violated the “rule of separation between church and 
 
episcopal, presbyterian, or congregational, it must be remembered that this typology is an approximation only. In a 
given case, there are any number of variations along a sliding scale of governance systems. And this is even more so 
once courts are confronted with religious polities outside of Christianity. 
146 See Order of Saint Benedict, 234 U.S. at 647-51. 
147 280 U.S. 1. 
148 344 U.S. 94. 
149 Id. at 106. 




The Watson Court had repudiated the English implied-trust rule and its departure-from-
doctrine standard in 1872, but only as a matter of federal common law.152 For well over half a 
century, a number of American states continued to follow the English implied-trust rule as a 
matter of their own common law. Kedroff, however, clearly foreshadowed the sweeping aside 
of the common law in those states still following the English rule.153 
In Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Church,154 the Supreme 
Court confirmed that Kedroff had elevated the principles of church autonomy such that they are 
required by the First Amendment.155 Presbyterian Church involved a doctrinal dispute 
between a general church and two of its local Georgia congregations. The congregations 
sought to leave the denomination and take with them the local property. The locals claimed 
that the general church had violated the organization’s constitution and had departed from 
original doctrine with respect to biblical teaching on particular social issues.156 At the time, 
Georgia still followed the implied-trust rule with its requisite fact-finding into alleged 
departures from doctrine. The rule required the state trial court to ask two religious 
questions: (1) What were the tenets of the general church at the time the local congregations 
first affiliated? (2) Had the general church departed substantially from one or more of these 
doctrines? On the basis of a jury finding that the general church had abandoned its original 
doctrines, the Georgia courts entered judgment awarding the property to the local 
congregations. On review, the U.S. Supreme Court again held that the First Amendment did 
not permit a departure-from-doctrine standard as a substantive rule of decision. The 
“American concept of the relationship between church and state,”157 the Court said, “leaves 
the civil court no role in determining ecclesiastical questions in the process of resolving 
 
151 Id. at 110. 
152 In Watson, the federal trial court had diversity jurisdiction. The rule of decision was based on federal 
common law rather than the First Amendment. This is because Watson was decided prior to Erie R.R. Co. v. 
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). In following the old rule of Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), federal 
courts sitting in diversity could deviate from state substantive law. Moreover, the First Amendment Religion 
Clauses had not yet been applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. 
153 Following Kedroff, the New York Court of Appeals sought to resolve the dispute in favor of the local-control 
faction. But in Kreshik v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, the Supreme Court summarily reversed. 363 U.S. 190. The High 
Court pointed out that a state court could no more disregard the First Amendment than could a state legislature. 
154 393 U.S. 440. 
155 Id. at 447. 
156 Id. at 442 n.l. 
157 Id. at 445-46. 
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property disputes.”158 Justice William Brennan, writing for a unanimous Court, went on to 
observe in dicta another path forward other than Watson’s rule of judicial deference. He 
wrote that civil courts could resolve disputes that concerned title to church property 
provided they follow “neutral principles of law, developed for use in all property disputes” 
of this sort.159 The opinion did not further define or elaborate on what those neutral 
principles of property law might be. Principles will vary state to state. But whatever the 
principles chosen, they could not displace the rule prohibiting a civil magistrate from taking 
up religious questions. 
The invocation of neutral principles in Presbyterian Church unsettled a century of law 
with its genesis in Watson. For some, Presbyterian Church was even mistakenly understood as 
replacing altogether the rule of judicial deference. A year later, the Court granted plenary 
review in Maryland & Va. Churches of God v. Church at Sharpsburg, another case involving a 
dispute over title—and just over title—to local church property in a dispute between two 
local churches, on the one hand, and general church authorities on the other.160 Once again, 
the local congregations sought to leave the denomination while retaining the local property. 
In an unsigned opinion, the Supreme Court approved of the Maryland courts applying state 
legislation  
governing the holding of property by religious corporations, upon language in 
the deeds conveying the properties in question to the local church corporations, 
upon the terms of the charters of the corporations, and upon provisions in the 
constitution of the General Eldership pertinent to the ownership and control of 
church property.161 
This was the state’s version of neutral principles, and the Supreme Court held it was an 
acceptable alternative for resolving the question via what Justice Brennan, concurring, 
termed the “formal title doctrine.”162 To be “neutral,” the alternative to judicial deference 
had to be applicable to all property disputes of a like sort, be the organization secular or 
 
158 Id. at 447 (emphasis in original). 
159 Id. at 449. 
160 396 U.S. 367. 
161 Id. at 367. 
162 Id. at 370 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
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religious. Church documents could be examined to a degree,163 but only through a secular 
lens: “Only express conditions [in a church document] that may be effected without 
consideration of [religious] doctrine are civilly enforceable” by a civil magistrate.164 At the very 
least, this is a sensitive task in which it is easy to err, a weakness in the neutral-principles 
approach. 
There was a danger that the neutral-principles option briefly mentioned in 
Presbyterian Church and applied in Church at Sharpsburg would be overread to apply to all 
religious disputes, not just formal title disputes. Hence, the Supreme Court’s ruling seven 
years later in Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich165 was corrective, a return to the 
basics: the general rule was still judicial deference to internal church authorities, and neutral 
principles would be permitted only when the sole issue for civil resolution was title to the 
local property. 
In Milivojevich, the Court—following the rule of judicial deference—rejected an 
Illinois bishop’s lawsuit challenging a top-down reorganization of the American-Canadian 
Diocese of the Serbian Eastern Orthodox Church and his removal from office. The Supreme 
Court determined that the dispute over internal church administration and a clerical 
appointment were insulated from civil review under the First Amendment.166 There was no 
dispute that the Serbian Eastern Orthodox Church was hierarchical and that the sole power to 
remove clerics rested with the ecclesiastical body in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, that already had 
decided the North American bishop’s case.167 Nor was there any question that the matters at 
issue were at heart a religious dispute.168 Nevertheless, the state court had decided in favor of the 
defrocked bishop because, in its view, the church’s adjudicatory procedures were applied in an 
arbitrary manner. On review, the Supreme Court rejected an “arbitrariness” exception to the 
judicial-deference rule when the question before the civil courts concerned church polity or 
supervision of a bishop.169 To accept authority over such a subject is not “consistent with the 
 
163 Id. at 369 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“To permit civil courts to probe deeply enough into the allocation of power 
within a church so as to decide where religious law places control over the use of church property would violate the 
First Amendment in much the same manner as civil determination of religious doctrine.”). 
164 Id. at 370 n.2 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
165 426 U.S. 696 (1976). 
166 Id. at 709, 713, 720, 721. 
167 Id. at 715. 
168 Id. at 709. 
169 Id. at 712-13. 
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constitutional mandate [that] the civil courts are bound to accept the decisions of the highest 
judicatories of a religious organization of hierarchical polity on matters of discipline, faith, 
internal organization, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law.”170 The civil courts may not even 
examine whether the church judicatory properly followed its own rules of procedure.171 
Using reasoning similar to that in Watson, the Milivojevich Court explained that there are 
three practical bases for the First Amendment prohibition on civil court authority in church 
matters. First, civil courts cannot delve into ambiguities in canon law or church documents.172 
These matters are too sensitive to permit any civil probing because such inquiries may prove 
intrusive and entail the court taking sides in a religious dispute.173 Second, civil judges have no 
training in canon law and theological interpretation and thus are not competent to judge such 
matters.174 Third, the “[c]onstitutional concepts of due process, involving secular notions of 
‘fundamental fairness,’” cannot be borrowed from American civil law and grafted onto a 
church’s polity to somehow modernize the rules followed by church judicatories.175 The 
Supreme Court also reversed the state court’s unraveling of the diocesan reorganization, holding 
that the Illinois court had impermissibly “delved into the various church constitutional 
provisions” relevant to “a matter of internal church government, an issue at the core of 
ecclesiastical affairs.”176 The enforcement of church documents, often unclear to a civil judge, 
cannot be accomplished “without engaging in a searching and therefore impermissible inquiry 
into church polity.”177 
In Milivojevich, there is no mention of neutral principles of law. Going forward, the 
disputing parties intended to remain as one church. So it appears that in such a circumstance, 
the rule of judicial deference is the only option. In contrast, in both Presbyterian Church and 
Church at Sharpsburg, going forward the disputing parties had no intention to remain as one 
 
170 Id. 
171 Id. at 713. 
172 Id. 
173 Recall that in Church at Sharpsburg, the Court permitted the examination of a church constitution. 396 U.S. at 
367-68. But the examination was limited to a reading of the document with a secular eye. And even such a limited 
reading was permitted only in a circumstance where neutral principles was a permitted option, namely, when the 
factions have forever parted ways and thus the legal question was solely resolution of title. 
174 Id. at 714 n.8. 
175 Id. at 714-15. See also id. at 712-13 (the finding that “the decisions of the Mother Church were ‘arbitrary’ was 
grounded upon an inquiry that persuaded the Illinois Supreme Court that the Mother Church had not followed its 
own laws and procedures,” and that is an inquiry prohibited by the First Amendment). 
176 Id. at 721. 
177 Id. at 723. 
38 
 
church. That being so, the sole remaining issue for the civil courts to consider was formal 
title. In the mind of the Court, only then is neutral principles a workable option.178 
The next and final case in this line of internecine contests is unlike Milivojevich but 
like Presbyterian Church and Church at Sharpsburg. In Jones v. Wolf, the Supreme Court 
again said that state courts may, in limited instances, devise neutral principles of law to 
adjudicate intrachurch disputes over formal title to property.179 Courts may examine church 
charters, constitutions, deeds, and trust indentures to resolve property disputes using 
“objective, well-established concepts of trust and property law familiar to lawyers and 
judges.”180 Courts can look to state corporation and property laws. To a limited extent, they may 
even “examine certain religious documents, such as a church constitution, for language of trust in 
favor of the general church.”181 The method’s advantage is that it sometimes “obviates 
entirely the need for an analysis or examination of ecclesiastical polity or doctrine in settling 
church property disputes . . . .”182 It serves the state’s interests in providing a forum for 
peaceful dispute resolution and quieting title to real property.183 Wolf approved of neutral 
principles of law as a permissible alternative to judicial deference, but Milivojevich is still good 
law. So it would seem that Wolf is contingent on the sole dispute before the magistrate being 
formal title. In such cases, it is up to the high court in each state to choose which rule to follow: 
deference or neutral principles. But the Supreme Court added the following caution to courts 
when using neutral principles: 
[T]here may be cases where the deed, the corporate charter, or the constitution of 
the general church incorporates religious concepts in the provisions relating to the 
ownership of property. In such a case, if the interpretation of the instruments of 
ownership would require the civil court to resolve a religious controversy, then the 
court must defer to the resolution of the doctrinal issue by the authoritative 
 
178 See Hutchison v. Thomas, 789 F.2d 392, 396 (6th Cir. 1986) (neutral-principles rule was “simply not applicable” 
to religious leadership dispute). 
179 443 U.S. at 602-06. The Wolf Court made it clear that a neutral-principles approach is not mandated by the First 
Amendment. Rather, in intrachurch property disputes, the use of neutral principles is a permissible alternative to the 
judicial-deference rule. Id. at 602. 
180 Id. at 602-03. 
181 Id. at 604. 
182 Id. at 605. 
183 Id. at 602 (“The State has an obvious and legitimate interest in the peaceful resolution of property disputes, and in 




Thus, in applying neutral principles the judge may examine church documents, if at all, only 
through a secular lens. The documents, if ambiguous or otherwise in need of interpretation, do 
not authorize the judge to resolve a religious question or dispute.185 
When a church’s polity is hierarchal and the dispute arises where the local church (or 
the majority faction thereof) wants to leave the general church, a rule of judicial deference 
will nearly always mean that the general church prevails in the dispute. And if the dispute is 
over title to property, the general church will likely be awarded title. The rule of deference 
postulates that this is fair because when the local members first joined the church, they 
impliedly consented to such top-down rule. In most instances, however, the local members 
gave the matter no thought. Further, it is the local members who typically donated the 
money to acquire the local property and maintain it down through the years. And it does not 
help the equities of the case that the officials governing the general church are often located 
in some other state, whereas the unhappy laity reside in the forum state and are pleading 
with their state officials to consider what is fair. A rule of neutral principles gives a state 
court the option to redefine fairness by requiring that title to local church property be treated 
in the same manner as title disputes to property held by other voluntary associations. 
The downside to neutral principles is that there is a departure from the doctrine of 
church autonomy where a general church’s hierarchical polity is ignored. But this downside 
is ameliorated somewhat because the general church administrators of hierarchical polity can 
arrange in advance the local church’s documents so that the general church prevails if a dispute 
arises. Officials in the general church probably have greater legal sophistication, and they know 
from experience the sort of things that can go wrong. And it is at this early point in time when 
the relationship between general and local is most amiable and full of optimism for the future. 
Further, the Supreme Court has offered neutral principles as an option, rather than requiring 
it, so the high court in each state may choose to retain the rule of judicial deference across 
 
184 Id. at 604. See also id. at 602 (“the First Amendment severely circumscribes the role that civil courts may 
play in resolving church property disputes”). 
185 Id. at 606-09. In Wolf, the Court approved the Georgia courts following neutral principles in the dispute between 
the local church and the general church. However, there was also a dispute between the local factions as to which 
was the “true local church.” Accordingly, the case was remanded back to the state courts to say what neutral 
principles applied to the dispute between the two local factions. If the state courts presumed the majority of the local 
voting members were the “true local church,” then they had to say how that presumption could be overcome, and to 
do so without posing religious questions. 
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all disputes. Finally, should a state retain the rule of judicial deference in all instances, 
disappointed members of a rebelling local church always retain their constitutional right of 
departure. True, in leaving their church, the disgruntled local members leave behind their 
past material contributions and affections connected to a particular building. But they have a 
constitutionally protected right to leave and start afresh a new church or join another 
fellowship across town more compatible with their spiritual beliefs. 
As a deviation from church autonomy doctrine, a rule of neutral principles still remains 
questionable. The 5-4 split in Wolf is demonstrative. While the rule of neutral principles is 
supposed to be “neutral,” most often it will favor the local church faction. That is the faction 
likely favored by state officials as they respond to petitions from their local constituents. 
Importantly, in all other types of internecine disputes the Court has resolved the matter by 
following a rule of judicial deference. There can be no resort to neutral principles in cases such 
as Milivojevich, Kreshik, Kedroff, and Gonzalez where the disputes are over doctrine or the 
selection of clerical leaders, as opposed to merely the monetary value of land and a building 
where worship takes place.186 
A danger is that neutral principles can spill over into other areas and contaminate the law. 
We see this with the law of defamation. However, any doubt as to whether the U.S. Supreme 
Court would extend the neutral-principles option beyond property disputes between separating 
factions was resolved with its unanimous decision in Hosanna-Tabor. Hosanna-Tabor was about 
personnel, as was Our Lady. When the employer is a church, personnel is policy. There was not 
a single mention of neutral principles in Hosanna-Tabor or Our Lady, putting them at odds with 
any prospect of a wider use of neutral principles. 
D. Defamation Claims Against a Church or Its Officials 
The Court in Our Lady said the ministerial exception “does not mean that religious 
institutions enjoy a general immunity from secular laws, but it does protect their autonomy with 
respect to internal management decisions that are essential to the institution’s central 
mission.”187 And in Hosanna-Tabor, Chief Justice Roberts wrote for the Court: 
 
186 The neutral-principles approach is well-suited only to religions whose worship is not site-specific, which includes 
much of Christianity. It does not address difficulties that arise where the property in dispute is itself religiously 
significant, as is the case for many Native American religions with their sacred sites. This is another weakness in the 
neutral-principles option. 
187 140 S. Ct. at 2060. 
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Today we hold only that the ministerial exception bars [antidiscrimination civil 
rights claims]. We express no view on whether the exception bars other types of 
suits, including actions by employees alleging breach of contract or tortious 
conduct by their religious employers. There will be time enough to address the 
applicability of the exception to other circumstances if and when they arise.188  
A number of such common-law claims have arisen, often brought by plaintiffs seeking to 
get around the ministerial exception. They urge judges to ask the wrong question: Can neutral 
principles apply? The results have been conflicting, but the confusion is entirely unnecessary. 
The proper question to determine whether church autonomy is a valid defense comes right out of 
Hosanna-Tabor: Is this a matter of internal governance? If so, we have a zone free of 
government interference. Again, the five subjects of internal governance are: (1) the 
determination of doctrine, including the validity, importance, or meaning of a religious question; 
(2) the determination of the organization’s polity; (3) the hiring, training, promotion, or dismissal 
of clerics, ministers, and other religious functionaries and leaders; (4) the admission and 
dismissal of members, as well as a determination of whether their affiliation is in good standing; 
and (5) internal communications by church officials and members concerning the foregoing four 
subject matters. If the prosecution of a claim of defamation falls in one or more of these five 
zones, the action is categorically barred.  
There are more than a few defamation cases in the lower state and federal courts that ask 
if the matter can be resolved by applying neutral principles.189 This shows a fundamental 
misunderstanding of the doctrine of church autonomy. The Supreme Court has allowed neutral 
principles only in internecine disputes over church property, and only then when the sole 
disputed issue is formal title. The question to ask is whether a plaintiff can prove the elements of 
defamation without invading any of the five protected areas of internal governance, then church 
 
188 565 U.S. at 196. 
189 See Diocese of Lubbock, 624 S.W.3d at 526-35 (Boyd, J., dissenting) (collecting lower court cases applying 
neutral principles to adjudicate defamation claims against churches). Many of these collected cases permit a claim to 
proceed if the allegedly defamatory remark was made to the public and away from church property. These are the 
wrong parameters. The church autonomy defense applies if proving the elements of a defamation claim entangles 
the court in one or more of the five subject matters previously identified by the Supreme Court as matters of 
“internal governance.” There is nothing more to the defense. True, in looking into whether proper care was taken to 
confine any communications about a disciplinary matter to those inside the church, it becomes relevant that the 
alleged tortious remark got released to the public. But this does not entail applying neutral principles of law as an 
alternative to the doctrine of church autonomy; this is a simple application of the fifth subject matter protected 
by the doctrine of church autonomy. 
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autonomy does not apply.190 On the other hand, if proving the elements of the tort does invade 
one or more of the five subject areas protected by church autonomy then the claim is 
categorically barred. Borrowing the rubric of neutral principles from Church at Sharpsburg and 
Wolf will surely introduce error. Some of the cases in the lower courts have gotten this matter 
correct,191 but others have missed the mark.192 
In still other defamation cases, plaintiff’s counsel points out that the allegedly libelous 
statement is on a wholly secular topic, not a religious topic.193 Once again, this shows a 
fundamental misunderstanding of church autonomy. As noted in Hosanna-Tabor, church 
autonomy extends to a religious entity’s entire zone of internal governance, to all matters strictly 
ecclesiastical, whether the act of governance is characterized as religious or secular. Church 
autonomy is a structural safeguard, not a right to be free from personal religious harm. It creates 
a government-free zone that no supposedly “neutral principle” can invade. In Hosanna-Tabor, 
 
190 As an example of a defamation claim that did not transgress the doctrine of church autonomy, see Ogle v. 
Hocker, 279 Fed. Appx. 391 (6th Cir. 2008). Ogle, an evangelist and ordained cleric in a Protestant denomination, 
brought claims of defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress against Hocker, another ordained cleric 
in the same denomination. Hocker was the pastor of a local church in the denomination, but Ogle was not on the 
ministerial staff of that church or otherwise connected to it. The alleged torts arose from a Sunday sermon 
illustration and later one-on-one conversations by Hocker in which he accused Ogle of homosexual advances 
toward him when the two were on an overseas mission trip. Hocker raised the defense of church autonomy. The tort 
claims did not involve a determination of doctrine or polity, nor were the remarks part of the denomination’s 
selection or supervision of Ogle as a cleric. There were disciplinary proceedings by the denomination against Ogle. 
However, Hocker’s local church had no jurisdiction as to the disciplinary actions involving Ogle, thus the remarks in 
Hocker’s sermon had no part in Ogle’s discipline. Finally, the lawsuit was not based on a matter involving any 
internal communications by officials in the denomination in the course of the disciplinary proceeding involving the 
Ogle. Because a pursuit of the tort claims fell outside the five subject areas protected by church autonomy, the 
appeals court was right to deny Hocker’s resort to the defense. 
191 See, e.g., Ex parte Bole, 103 S.3d 40 (Ala. 2021) (statement during investigation into and removal of pastor); In 
re Alief Vietnamese All. Church, 576 S.W.3d 421 (Tex. App. 2019) (statement about deacon during internal dispute 
over governance); Sumner, 27 Cal. App. 5th 577 (statement during termination of dean of seminary who was 
regarded as “minister”); Orr v. Fourth Episcopal Dist. African Methodist Episcopal Church, 111 N.E.3d 181 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 2018) (statement during termination of minister); Pfeil v. St. Matthews Evangelical Lutheran Church, 877 
N.W.2d 528 (Minn. 2016) (statement during church meeting to consider excommunication); Heard v. Johnson, 810 
A.2d 871 (D.C. 2002) (statement during termination of pastor); Hiles v. Episcopal Diocese, 773 N.E.2d 929 (Mass. 
2002) (statement during disciplinary proceeding against priest); Hadnot v. Shaw, 826 P.2d 978 (Okla. 1992) 
(statement during excommunication of two members); Hutchison v. Thomas, 789 F.2d 392 (6th Cir. 1986) 
(statement during disciplinary proceeding against pastor). 
192 See, e.g., Galetti v. Reeve, 331 P.3d 997 (N.M. Ct. App. 2017) (statement during proceedings to terminate 
minister); Banks v. St. Matthew Baptist Church, 750 S.E.2d 605 (S.C. 2013) (statement by pastor during 
congregational meeting to remove three church trustees); Tubra v. Cooke, 225 P.3d 862 (Or. Ct. App. 2010) 
(statement during hearing over pastor’s misconduct); Bowie v. Murphy, 624 S.E.2d 74 (Va. 2006) (statement during 
church meeting to remove deacon); Marshall v. Munro, 845 P.2d 424 (Alaska 1993) (statement by church official in 
letter of reference about former pastor seeking new employment). 
193 See, e.g., Sumner, 27 Cal. App. 5th at 589, 593-94, 596 (statements by defendants  during termination of the dean 
of a seminary). 
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the protected act of internal governance was to dismiss a teacher-minister for what would 
normally pass for secular reasons—namely, the school’s retaliation for her invoking the 
Americans with Disability Act. Counsel for the EEOC misunderstood the nature of the doctrine 
of church autonomy when she told the Court that the school’s religious defense was pretextual, 
that is, not really religious. The Court responded: 
That suggestion misses the point of the ministerial exception. The purpose of the 
exception is not to safeguard a church’s decision to fire a minister only when it is 
made for a religious reason. The exception instead ensures that the authority to 
select and control who will minster to the faithful—a matter “strictly 
ecclesiastical,” . . . —is the church’s alone.194 
Counsel for the church may have additional defenses to the claim of defamation—such as 
that the allegedly defamatory remark was true—which in turn may circle us back to the First 
Amendment problem of whether the alleged truth or falsehood of a defamatory remark is a 
prohibited religious question. 
III. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE TO PROPERLY ORDER THE TWO CENTERS OF AUTHORITY 
The dichotomy between free-exercise rights and the doctrine of church autonomy has 
many parallels to the dichotomy between constitutional rights and constitutional structure, and 
these parallels illuminate the special procedures used in these cases that may otherwise be 
puzzling. For example, as a defense the doctrine of church cannot be waived. Another such 
special procedure is the initial limitation on discovery into the inner workings of a religious 
organization lest a civil court’s entanglement with the entity’s internal affairs via document 
demands, depositions, and the like generate a new violation of church autonomy. There is also 
the collateral order doctrine permitting an interlocutory appeal from a denial of a motion to 
dismiss or for summary judgment when a trial court rebuffs a ministerial exception defense. And 
when the matter before the court is a church autonomy case, there is no balancing against the 
government’s interests. Rather, there is an immediate dismissal, and the case is at an end. 
The need for these special procedures comes about because the doctrine of church 
autonomy involves a discrete zone of freedom for churches and other religious organizations. As 
such, church autonomy is a structural restraint on the government’s power that creates breathing 
space for religious organizations to go about matters of internal governance, whether those 
 
194 565 U.S. at 194-95. 
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governance decisions are religiously motivated or secular. This is a carveout of a distinct area of 
operations touching on doctrine, polity, and membership, as well as the selection, training, or 
removal of the ministers that carry out central religious functions. 
A. The Ministerial Exception: A Defense in the Nature of a Categorical Immunity 
As with most matters concerning church autonomy, the best place to start is with the 
Supreme Court’s 2012 decision in Hosanna-Tabor. This was the Supreme Court’s first church 
autonomy case since Wolf was decided in 1979, breaking a silence spanning a third of a century. 
As discussed earlier, Hosanna-Tabor involved a fourth-grade teacher who sued her employer, a 
church-related school, alleging retaliation for having asserted antidiscrimination rights under the 
ADA.195 The school raised as a defense the ministerial exception. The exception recognizes that 
religious organizations have exclusive authority to select their own ministers—which necessarily 
entails not just initial hiring but also promotion, training, supervision, retention, and other terms 
and conditions of employment.196 As a matter of First Amendment church autonomy, the 
ministerial exception overrides not just the ADA, but a number of venerable employment 
antidiscrimination statutes.197 
The Supreme Court observed that: 
Requiring a church to accept or retain an unwanted minister, or punishing a church 
for failing to do so, intrudes upon more than a mere employment decision. Such 
action interferes with the internal governance of the church, depriving the church 
of control over the selection of those who will personify its beliefs.198  
The Court said that although “the interest of society in the enforcement of employment 
discrimination statutes is undoubtedly important . . . [,] so too is the interest of religious groups 
in choosing who will preach their beliefs, teach their faith, and carry out their mission.”199 
Accordingly, in a lawsuit that strikes at the ability of the church to determine its leaders and 
teachers, any balancing of interests between a vigorous eradication of employment 
 
195 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. 
196 See Demkovich, 3 F.4th 968 (holding that ministerial exception applied to claims of employment discrimination 
that alleged a hostile environment as a result of harassment during supervision). 
197 See, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq.; The Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 
U.S.C. § 206(d); Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq. 
198 Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 188. 
199 Id. at 196. 
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discrimination, on the one hand, and institutional freedom, on the other hand, is a balance 
already struck by the First Amendment on the side of church autonomy.200  
Church autonomy cases have been relatively few on the Court’s docket. But they are 
powerful because once it is determined that the doctrine applies, no rejoinder is permitted by the 
opposing party. That is, once it is determined that a lawsuit falls within one of the five subject 
matters of internal church governance, there is no follow-on judicial balancing. The case is at an 
end, and it remains only for a final judgment to be entered.201 There is no balancing because 
there can be no legally sufficient governmental interest to justify interfering in the internal 
governance of a church. As the Court in Hosanna-Tabor intoned, the First Amendment has 
already struck the balance.202 In this regard, the Court criticized the EEOC’s rejoinder to the 
Court’s case-ending conclusion that the ministerial exception applied. The EEOC asserted that 
the school’s religious reason for firing Perich was pretextual.203 “This suggestion misses the 
point of the ministerial exception,” wrote the Chief Justice: 
The purpose of the [ministerial] exception is not to safeguard a church’s decision 
to fire a minister only when it is made for a religious reason. The exception instead 
ensures that the authority to select and control who will minister to the faithful—a 
matter “strictly ecclesiastical,” . . . is the church’s alone.204 
Lower courts applying Hosanna-Tabor have rightly interpreted the ministerial exception, 
not as a personal religious liberty but as a structural limitation on the government’s actions.205 
These cases are in large part rooted in the Establishment Clause, the text of which bespeaks a 
structural negation of the government’s delegated powers: “Congress shall make no law” about a 
discrete subject described as “an establishment of religion.” In disestablishing a church, the state 
begins to separate and properly order relations between church and state. As Chief Justice 
 
200 Id. (“When a minister who has been fired sues her church alleging that her termination was discriminatory, the 
First Amendment has struck the balance for us.”). 
201 Id. at 194 (“Because Perich was a minister within the meaning of the exception, the First Amendment requires 
dismissal of this employment discrimination suit against her religious employer.”). 
202 Id. at 196 (“When a minister who has been fired sues her church alleging that her termination was discriminatory, 
the First Amendment has struck the balance for us.”). 
203 Id. at 194. 
204 Id. at 194-95 (internal citation omitted). 
205 See Lee v. Sixth Mount Zion Baptist Church of Pittsburgh, 903 F.3d 113, 118 n.4 (3d Cir. 2018) (recognizing 
that the ministerial exception is a structural restraint “rooted in constitutional limits on judicial authority”); Conlon 
v. InterVarsity Christian Fellowship, 777 F.3d 829, 836 (6th Cir. 2015) (“The ministerial exception is a structural 
limitation imposed on the government by the Religion Clauses.”). 
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Roberts wrote, “the Free Exercise Clause . . . protects a religious group’s right to shape its own 
faith and mission” by controlling who are its ministers. A personal right of the church is 
burdened when the church is coerced to employ an unwanted minister. But “the Establishment 
Clause [also] prohibits government involvement in such ecclesiastical decisions.”206 Here enters 
the prohibition on the civil courts answering religious questions. The government acts beyond its 
limited, delegated powers when it transgresses on the prerogative of a church which alone should 
control the employment of its ministers. The Chief Justice gave examples of the English Crown 
interfering with the appointment of clergy in the established Church of England.207 He wrote that 
the Establishment Clause was adopted in America over against the Church of England model and 
to flatly deny such power to our newly formed national government.208 
There is a welcome absence of interest balancing in Hosanna-Tabor. Balancing tests are 
still valid under the Free Exercise Clause when religion is targeted209 or discriminated against.210 
But that is not the case when the subject matter warrants the categorical protection of what 
Justice Alito in Our Lady called “religious autonomy.”211 In the latter instance, the First 
Amendment (understood against the backdrop of America’s state-by-state disestablishments that 
broke with the Church of England model212) has determined that hiring, promoting, supervising, 
and dismissing ministers is a power reserved to the church alone—a power within the zone of 
internal governance denied to Caesar. 
B. Affirmative Defenses and Waivability 
With reference to the ministerial exception, footnote 4 in Hosanna-Tabor noted that the 
lower courts were divided over whether the exception is an affirmative defense or a matter that 
goes to the court’s subject matter jurisdiction. The issue had not been briefed or argued by the 
parties, but amici had touched on it. Without any analysis, the Supreme Court said in the 
footnote that the ministerial exception was to be regarded as an affirmative defense.213 
 
206 Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 188-89. 
207 Id. at 182-85. 
208 Id. at 183-85. 
209 Church of Lukumi, 508 U.S. 520. 
210 Fulton, 141 S. Ct. 1868. 
211 Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 198. Many have observed that “ministerial exception” is not an apt label for the rule. 
See supra note 46-49 and accompanying text. After Our Lady, “religious functionaries” would be a better term; but 
it omits the top administrators to which the rule also applies. 
212 Our Lady, 140 S. Ct. at 2061-62; Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 183-85. 
213 Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 195 n.4. 
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One way to understand footnote 4 is that the Chief Justice was passing judgment on 
nothing more than a matter of civil pleading and practice. Hence, when there is a lawsuit that 
might implicate the ministerial exception, as with any affirmative defense it is the responsibility 
of the defendant to raise it in a pleading.214 Because the allowance for amending a pleading is 
quite liberal,215 a waiver for failure to timely plead the defense will rarely occur. In lieu of a 
responsive pleading, the defendant-church may initially raise the affirmative defense by a motion 
to dismiss for failure to state a claim.216 If additional materials are submitted in support of the 
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, it becomes a motion for summary judgment.217 
The immediate difference as a result of the Court’s ruling in footnote 4 is slight. In 
motions under Rule 12(b)(6), the defendant-church carries the burden of proof, whereas under 
Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintiff would have the burden of convincing the trial court that it has subject 
matter jurisdiction. As an evidentiary matter, this allocation of the burden of pleading makes 
sense. When the key issue is whether the plaintiff in an employment discrimination suit is a 
minister and works for an entity that is religious, much of the relevant information is in the hands 
of the church. Thus, the church reasonably may be allocated the initial burden of producing 
evidence. And should the evidence show that the plaintiff is a minister and works for an entity 
that is religious, then the First Amendment requires that the trial court enter summary judgment 
for the church and end the lawsuit. Any such judgment would be on the merits and grounded in 
the First Amendment, not a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction under Article III of the U.S. 
Constitution or the jurisdictional granting statutes in title 28 of the U.S. Code.218 It follows that 
footnote 4 is not problematic if it is only about civil procedure. To be sure, sometimes buried in 
the interstices of civil pleading and practice are deeper matters of consequence.219 But it 
overreads footnote 4 to make this one such instance.220  
 
214 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c). 
215 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). 
216 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Because of the ruling in footnote 4, the defendant-church may not raise the 
ministerial exception by motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). 
217 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d) and 56. 
218 It bears noting that nothing in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure can expand or contract the subject matter 
jurisdiction of the federal courts. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 82. 
219 See Gregory A. Kalscheur, Civil Procedure and the Establishment Clause: Exploring the Ministerial Exception, 
Subject-Matter Jurisdiction, and the Freedom of the Church, 17 WM & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 43 (2008). Professor 
Kalscheur comments favorably in regarding the church autonomy defense as structural. Id. at 63-68. 




A difficulty arises in that as a general matter an affirmative defense is waived if not 
timely raised by a defendant.221 But the nature of the church autonomy doctrine is that it can 
never be waived. This is because church autonomy is not a personal right, but is structural in 
nature, keeping two centers of authority, church and state, in their right relationship. For 
government to avoid violating an individual right is a matter of constitutional duty owed to each 
person. On the other hand, for government to avoid exceeding a restraint imposed by the U.S. 
Constitution’s structure is a duty owed to the entire body politic. Rights, because they are 
personal, can be waived by the rights holder, whereas structure, because it is there to benefit the 
entire body politic, cannot be waived by the named party defendant. 
When constitutional structure delegates, separates, and limits governmental power, one 
happy but indirect consequence of fidelity to that prescribed structure is the preservation of 
individual liberty by avoiding concentrations of power. Church autonomy doctrine separates the 
power of government and the authority of organized religion. And when the government cannot 
invade a church’s zone of autonomy, individuals and the organizations they form might 
experience a slight consequential increase in personal religious liberty. It is for this reason that 
the doctrine of church autonomy registers in both the proper structuring of church-state relations 
to protect the church with respect to its internal governance (the Establishment Clause), and also 
in the safeguarding of the free exercise of the church (the Free Exercise Clause).222 We need not 
be puzzled that church autonomy is rooted in both Religion Clauses. 
That church autonomy is nonwaivable can be consequential in multiple ways. For 
example, a government benefit cannot be conditioned on the beneficiary waiving its mastery 
over a matter of internal governance because the doctrine of church autonomy cannot be waived. 
Indeed, because it is structural, church autonomy cannot be waived even when done so 
knowingly and willingly by an intended beneficiary. A ready application, of course, is when the 
 
221 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c)(1). 
222 Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 184 (“The Establishment Clause prevents the Government from appointing 
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government attempts to attach “strings” to its funding programs. Such strings are ineffective 
when up against a church autonomy defense. 
Notwithstanding footnote 4, the idea that church autonomy is “jurisdictional” goes all the 
way back to Watson v. Jones,223 and the confusion of church autonomy being jurisdictional 
rather than structural carries forward in the Court’s later cases.224 While church autonomy is 
structural, subject matter jurisdiction is also a matter of constitutional structure. This is where the 
confusion may have started. But we now see that church autonomy is best understood as 
structural, and that clears up the confusion. 
Watson is not cited in Hosanna-Tabor footnote 4, thus no one can claim that the Chief 
Justice was overruling the Court’s discussion of jurisdiction in Watson and later cases. Watson 
was in federal court based on diversity jurisdiction, and the substantive law applied in the ruling 
was federal general common law per Swift v. Tyson.225 When Watson referred to “jurisdiction,” it 
was likely not jurisdiction in the sense of the judicial authority conferred by Article III, clause 2 
of the U.S. Constitution. Rather, the reference to jurisdiction was in the sense that the federal 
government is one of limited, delegated powers, with the Religion Clauses negating any power in 
Congress to make a law that regulates a church with respect to matters of internal governance. 
As we have seen, that negation of power is structural with regard to church-government relations 
and thus cannot be waived.226 True, when the Court decided Watson—a diversity case 
originating in Kentucky—the First Amendment did not apply to the states. But federal general 
common law was about applying the better rule to a diversity case in federal court, and the better 
rule was the one that acknowledged that the U.S. is a federalist republic of states with no 
established religion, a nation that recognizes the mutually beneficial separation between 
organized religion and government. That assessment was confirmed in Kedroff when the doctrine 
 
223 80 U.S. at 732-34 (holding that courts have no jurisdiction to decide ecclesiastical issues). 
224 See Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 713-14 (holding that courts have no authority to decide ecclesiastical issues). The 
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225 See supra note 152 (explaining the rulings of Erie and Swift). 
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of church autonomy, via the First and Fourteenth Amendments, was explicitly applied to the 
states.227 Because church autonomy is derived from both Religion Clauses, and aspects of those 
clauses are structural, church autonomy cannot be waived. This is what Kedroff accomplished, 
and Hosanna-Tabor’s footnote 4 did not reverse Kedroff. 
C. Limiting Discovery and Permitting Interlocutory Appeals 
NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago was the first occasion for the Supreme Court to note 
that the ministerial exception defense may call for limitations on civil discovery into the 
operations of a church or similar religious organization.228 Facing the prospect of federal officers 
probing into allegations of unfair labor practices by religious officials at a primary and secondary 
Catholic school, the Justices warned, “It is not only the conclusions that may be reached . . . 
which may impinge on rights guaranteed by the Religion Clauses, but also the very process of 
inquiry leading to findings and conclusions.”229 Concurring in Hosanna-Tabor, Justices Alito 
and Elena Kagan explained that “the mere adjudication of [religious] questions would pose grave 
problems for religious autonomy.”230 The lower courts have followed suit. For example, in 
Whole Woman’s Health v. Smith, a trial court’s pretrial order compelling a faith-based crisis 
pregnancy center to respond to discovery was reversed on appeal in part because discovery 
would have revealed internal communications and otherwise interfered with the internal 
decision-making processes of the ministry.231 An interlocutory appeal was allowed on the 
discovery issue because of the structural nature of the defense.232 And while merits discovery 
should be delayed in such cases, discovery concerning the affirmative defense itself is proper 
(e.g., does plaintiff meet the definition of “minister”?). This is not to say that all merits discovery 
should be delayed in every church autonomy case. Rather, the purpose of the limitation is to keep 
the intrusion by civil discovery from generating a new invasion of the autonomy of the defendant 
religious organization. Accordingly, the scope of a Rule 26(c) protective order should pertain to 
the subject matters that concern the immunity: determinations of doctrine and polity; the 
 
227 See supra note 148-51 and accompanying text. 
228 440 U.S. 490. 
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230 565 U.S. at 205. 
231 896 F.3d 362, 373-74 (5th Cir. 2018). 
232 Id. at 367-68, 373. See McCarthy v. Fuller, 714 F.3d 971, 976 (7th Cir. 2013) (interlocutory appeal allowed 
because harm from government intrusion irreparable). 
51 
 
admission and removal of members; the hiring, training, and removal of ministers and other 
church leaders; and internal communications about all of the foregoing.233 
When a church has raised the ministerial exception by pleading or motion and the 
affirmative defense has been denied by the trial court, the structural nature of church autonomy 
calls for an interlocutory appeal. The requisites for interlocutory appeal under the collateral order 
doctrine are that permitting an immediate appeal will conclusively settle the disputed issue, the 
appeal would resolve an important issue separate from the merits, and the issue is effectively 
unreviewable if the case is allowed to proceed to final judgment.234 If the trial court is mistaken 
in its ministerial exception ruling, to allow the case to continue to be prepared for trial and fully 
tried on the merits is to reoffend the First Amendment with new church-state entanglements, and 
to do so in a manner that can never be corrected on appeal. In other words, if discovery into the 
merits goes forward this time a new harm of invading the church’s internal governance will be at 
the hands of the trial court. And once that new harm is incurred under the coercion of a discovery 
order, it cannot be redressed by the later payment of monetary damages (the court has absolute 
immunity) or otherwise undone by later equitable relief.235 Thus, an interlocutory appeal should 
be allowed under the collateral order doctrine. 
IV. TEXT, HISTORY, AND THE DOCTRINE OF CHURCH AUTONOMY 
A. Reading the First Amendment Text 
When the plain text is definitive, the courts need not resort to an interpretive rule, be it 
originalist or otherwise. The First Amendment reads:  
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting 
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the 
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a 
redress of grievances. 
Although it ends with a semicolon, the first clause would stand alone as a complete sentence. 
And while there is but one clause addressing religious freedom, there are two participial phrases 
(“respecting an establishment” and “prohibiting the free exercise”) modifying the object (“no 
 
233 See Peter J. Smith and Robert W. Tuttle, Civil Procedure and the Ministerial Exception, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1847, 1876-78 (2018); id. at 1878 n.232 (collecting cases) [hereafter “Smith and Tuttle”]; Mark E. Chopko and 
Marissa Parker, Still a Threshold Question: Refining the Ministerial Exception Past Hosanna-Tabor, 10 FIRST 
AMEND. L. REV. 233, 293 (2012) [hereafter “Chopko and Parker”]. 
234 Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949). 
235 See Smith and Tuttle at 1878-81; Chopko and Parker at 289-98. 
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law”) of the verb (“shall make”). It is therefore entirely proper to think in terms of two separate 
disempowerments on the sentence’s subject (“Congress”). This is not to say that the two 
restraints on power can never overlap. The government might transgress both participial 
phrases—much like a single law might violate a person’s right to both free speech and due 
process. However, notwithstanding an occasional overlap, the nonestablishment restraint and the 
free-exercise restraint give rise to separate causes of action. 
In closely observing the text, we see that the first participial phrase (“respecting an 
establishment”) is different in nature from the amendment’s rights-based participial phrases 
(“prohibiting the free exercise” and “abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press”). The 
latter two forbid “prohibiting” and “abridging” and thus restrain the government with respect to a 
person’s free exercise or free expression. These two phrases can be understood to acknowledge 
that people have unalienable or natural rights to free exercise and free expression. They imply a 
moral autonomy inherent to each individual rights-holder that the government does not have the 
authority to easily overcome. On the other hand, the participial phrase “respecting an 
establishment” is not about acknowledging an intrinsic right because of one’s humanity, but is a 
reference to a discrete subject matter (“an establishment of religion”) that is being placed outside 
(“no law”) of the government’s authority. This difference in participial phrases bespeaks a 
difference in their function: acknowledging an intrinsic human right versus prohibiting the 
government’s involvement in a discrete zone of activity. 
As a matter of legal processes, a constitutional restraint on government involvement in a 
particular subject matter requires structure. The Establishment Clause operates like a structural 
distancing of two centers of authority: government and religion. Constitutional structure 
delegates, separates, and limits power. A happy consequence of well-maintained constitutional 
structure is the prevention of concentrations of power that can in turn lead to losses of personal 
liberty. In the text of the Establishment Clause, we have a separation of the authority of 
government and the authority of organized religion. All persons in a republic indirectly benefit 
when the government cannot exercise power respecting “an establishment of religion.” An 
individual complainant cannot waive this separation of powers any more than she can waive a 
federal court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction (also a structural bar). Rather, the structural 
separation is there to benefit more than just the complainant before the court. This is much like 
the three-branch structuring we call “separation of powers”; the separation of the branches is 
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there not just for the benefit of an individual complainant, but for all persons subject to the 
Constitution. 
Given the different natures of the Establishment Clause (structural) and the Free Exercise 
and Free Speech Clauses (rights-based), the modern Supreme Court is correct when it applies the 
Establishment Clause as a structural restraint that properly separates the two centers of authority 
we call church and government. Stated differently, the Court envisions the Establishment Clause 
as policing the boundary between church and government. It understands its judicial task as 
keeping governmental power from entering a zone the subject matter of which is defined as “an 
establishment of religion.” This is for the mutual good of the two things separated, church and 
government.236 
The separation should not be exaggerated. This is a separation of the institutions of 
religion from the institutions of the republic. While the institutions of church and government 
can be separated, religion and politics cannot. Such a disjunction would rob believers and the 
organizations they form of a freedom enjoyed by all others. Churches and other houses of 
worship appropriately speak to how their teachings bear on social and political issues, all 
consistent with their right to freedom of speech.237 
Regarding the Establishment Clause as structural explains several features in the church 
autonomy case law.238 For example, there are relaxed rules concerning standing to sue because in 
lawsuits over structure there are often no parties with individualized harm.239 Further, in contrast 
to free-exercise claims that remedy only religious harms, the Establishment Clause provides a 
remedy for nonreligious harms such as economic damages and loss of academic freedom.240 This 
also accounts for why federal courts sometimes frame the operation of the Establishment Clause 
as a limit on their subject matter jurisdiction.241 Whereas free-exercise lawsuits seek to yield a 
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personal right that is subject to strict scrutiny, a prima facie Establishment Clause claim is not 
subject to a balancing test that weighs governmental interests against a claimant’s right. Either 
the Establishment Clause is violated or it is not—no balancing. This begins to explain why both 
the prohibition on courts answering religious questions and the ministerial exception are 
substantially rooted in the no-establishment principle, as befits rules that derive from church 
autonomy. 
 The plain text of the First Amendment takes us a long way toward explaining the reach 
and limits of the doctrine of church autonomy. But it can take us only so far. The text does not 
tell us what the founders meant by “an establishment of religion.” Hosanna-Tabor and Our Lady 
teach us that this calls for a turn to history, in particular a rejection of the Church of England 
model at the time of America’s founding. 
B. History as a Backdrop to Church Autonomy 
 Constantine converted to Christianity in 312 A.D. while commanding a Roman army in a 
complex series of civil wars. As Western Emperor, he joined in promulgating the Edict of Milan 
in 313 A.D., which legalized Christianity in the Roman Empire and restored property taken 
during persecution. By late in the 4th century, Christianity had slowly but surely become the 
official religion of the empire. While the resulting church and empire were organizationally 
distinct, they formed two aspects of a single whole that we now call Christendom. It was 
understood that these two centers of authority would, on the one hand, cooperate in upholding 
and defending the church and, on the other, cooperate in unifying citizens around a common 
creed thereby giving legitimacy to the empire. 
 In 1054 A.D., a dispute over polity ripened into a schism that severed the eastern church 
in Constantinople from the western church centered at Rome. Unlike the eastern rite, the church 
at Rome remained a coequal power, at times dominating monarchs and at times being dominated 
by them. The Papal Revolution of 1050-1080 was a series of reforms initiated under Pope 
Gregory VII that dealt with the independence of the church and moral conduct of the clergy.242 
The reforms are codified in two major documents: dictatus papae, which centralizes authority in 
the papacy, and the libertas ecclesiae papal bull, which is about the freedom of church from 
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temporal rulers.243 The reforms required clerical celibacy, did away with simony (the sale of 
ecclesiastical offices and sacred things), and denied civil authorities the power to appoint church 
officials. Going forward, the Roman Church wielded its control over sacraments to visit 
deprivations upon civil rulers, and those same rulers used their superior military power to force 
the church to conform to the wishes of the monarch. It is also fair to say that through all these 
back and forth struggles, the church preserved classical culture and nurtured the arts, as well as 
ameliorated the harshness of peasant life. 
In 1517, the German priest Martin Luther is reputed to have nailed his 95 Theses to the 
door of Wittenberg’s Castle Church. The resulting Reformation shattered the unity of Western 
Catholic Christianity. The conflagration that ensued lasted for over 130 years, a period that today 
we refer to as the “religious wars.” But that is imposing a modern construct on the conflict. For 
the combatants, there was no pronounced demarcation between the civil and the religious. 
Rather, what unified the political core of each state was its religious worldview. An interim 
settlement was reached at the Peace of Augsburg in 1555, with the adoption of the simple, if 
crude, principle of cuios regio, eius religio (whose region, his religion). The Treaty of 
Westphalia in 1648, ending the Thirty Years’ War, left Catholics in control of the continental 
south and Protestants established in the north. The horror and dissipation of the wars 
strengthened the hand of the secular rulers at the expense of the churches, and this was especially 
so in the case of Protestants because of their internal division and their greater dependence on the 
military protection of the princes. 
The Westphalian settlement that emerged entailed sovereign nation-states with marked 
borders at which access could be controlled, an established church, and religious dissenters. 
Dissenters were often persecuted or driven into exile, in large measure because the presence of 
nonconformists within the political polity was thought to destabilize the state. The persecution 
was always at the hands of the state, but the churches were complicit. Growing abhorrence at the 
violence wrought by religious persecution, the stubbornness of dissenters even unto death, and 
the emerging influence of the Enlightenment caused the pattern to evolve yet again in the 
direction of sovereign states, established churches, and juridical toleration of nonconforming 
sects. 
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The English Reformation was different from that on the continent. It began with Henry 
VIII’s desire to annul his marriage to Catherine whom he thought unable to bear him a male heir. 
When the Pope refused, Henry, with the complicity of Parliament, passed the 1534 Act of 
Supremacy establishing the Church of England with himself as its supreme head.244 This set-in 
motion a long series of attempts to reclaim Great Britain for the Roman Church, which in turn 
worked to generate deep-seated anti-Catholicism among a majority of the English and Scots-
Irish. This antipathy toward Catholics would later be carried overseas by those embarking for the 
British colonies in North America. During the century-and-a-half from Luther to the 1688-89 
Glorious Revolution and coronation of William and Mary, England experienced a Calvinist 
Reformation under the child-king Edward VI, a Golden Age under Elizabeth I (who backed the 
Church of England to compel religious unity to in turn stabilize the Crown), a civil war between 
Anglo-Catholic royalists and Calvinist parliamentarians won by the latter, the Puritan 
Protectorate of Oliver Cromwell, Restoration under Charles II, and the forced abdication of his 
brother the Catholic James II in favor of the Dutch Protestant William of Orange. The 1689 
British Act of Toleration was adopted at the time of the Glorious Revolution; it extended legal 
protection to non-Anglican Protestants (but not Catholics). 
Such were the church-state relationships and tolerations brought to the British colonies in 
North America, in variations both strong and weak. Many of the ancestors of the American 
revolutionary generation had come to these shores to escape the religious persecution and tumult 
associated with these Old World events. In British America, the pressing religious dynamic was 
not Anglicanism versus Catholicism, but Anglicanism versus Congregationalism versus other 
Protestants. Yet Old World church-state establishments obtained in the New World early on 
except for the special cases of Rhode Island and, partly at least, the Quaker settlement of 
Pennsylvania.245 Maryland was chartered in 1632 as a colony where Catholics were fully 
welcome and equal to Protestants, but the colony was taken over by force in 1689 by Anglican 
arms.246 
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The Church of England was an agency of the Crown and seen as projecting British policy 
into revolutionary America. American patriots (not the Tories) viewed the Church of England as 
tyrannical, which was also the view held by the Congregationalists, the established church in 
much of New England. American dissenters and Enlightenment statesmen went a step further 
and held the view that established churches of any denomination—in their willingness to do the 
bidding of the state in service of the state—had corrupted Christianity.247 This is seen, for 
example, in James Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance,248 as well as the writings of Baptist 
ministers Isaac Backus and John Leland.249 The spiritual corruption was perceived as both 
external and internal. The external was the established church imposing burdens of conscience 
on nonconforming religions, and the internal was the government entangling itself in the 
operations of the established church. The solution, these dissenters and statemen maintained, was 
disestablishment. Disestablishment, or the deregulation of religion, would both liberate the 
church and enlighten governance by the new republican states. 
The Court in Hosanna-Tabor did not even acknowledge—let alone rely on—the 
foregoing account of the events on the European continent, with the church’s fluctuating bids for 
power over and independence from the government from Constantine through Gregory VII and 
eventually to the Westphalian states.250 Instead, in the view of the Supreme Court, the proper 
historical framework for understanding the First Amendment’s doctrine of church autonomy was 
nearer in time and closer to home. Under the guiding principle of originalism (although 
originalism was not expressly mentioned in Hosanna-Tabor), that meant looking to what 
motivated revolutionary Americans on this side of the Atlantic: war with Great Britain, including 
rejection of its Church of England model. The opinion’s history begins in earnest with the 
English Reformation and the establishment of the Church of England in 1534,251 moves forward 
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to the religious struggles in England and resulting immigration to these shores, then discusses the 
First Federal Congress and the adoption of the First Amendment,252 and finally relates two 
incidents involving James Madison and his part in early applications of the Religion Clauses.253 
The legal principles on display in this historical account were then brought to bear on the case at 
bar concerning the entanglement of federal nondiscrimination law with the dismissal by a 
religious school of one of its teachers who had religious duties. Similarly, in Our Lady the High 
Court considered the 16th and 17th century English religious conflicts to have influenced British 
emigrants to seek religious freedom in the American colonies.254 The Court also acknowledged 
that the Church of England’s oppressive policies in colonies such as Maryland and New York 
were a prelude to the revolution here.255 
The Supreme Court in Hosanna-Tabor and Our Lady showed no interest in the Papal 
Revolution of the 11th century out of which Catholic scholars derive freedom of the church 
(libertas ecclesiae). This deprives the Court of some distant principles to undergird the doctrine 
of church autonomy, but it also frees it from arguing that the Papal Revolution is a suitable 
undergirding for church autonomy as embedded in our late 18th century Constitution. 
 As noted above, James Madison played a central role in the history that was relied on in 
Hosanna-Tabor. Chief Justice Roberts noted the Virginia representative’s central role in drafting 
the Religion Clauses in the First Federal Congress,256 and he relied on two episodes involving 
Madison and early applications of those clauses. In the first, Madison as Secretary of State under 
Thomas Jefferson declined to involve the U.S. in the appointment of a Catholic bishop in the 
Louisiana Territory.257 The second episode had Madison as President vetoing a bill to 
incorporate an Episcopal church in the District of Columbia. In Madison’s veto message, he did 
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not say the bill was unconstitutional because incorporating a church created a prohibited 
establishment. Indeed, it was becoming common at the time for churches to incorporate under 
state corporation laws to ease the acquisition and transfer of real property, to limit liability, to 
allow lawsuits in the corporate name, and to secure corporate life in perpetuity. Rather, 
according to Madison, the particular corporate articles set out in the bill would have deeply 
entangled federal officers in the details of removal and appointment of clergy in this particular 
church, and that was its constitutional defect.258 
There are additional episodes that buttress the interpretive point made by Chief Justice 
Roberts. For example, at a time when military hostilities had ceased with victory at Yorktown in 
October 1781 and the states still remained loosely united under the Articles of Confederation, a 
well-documented incident occurred that illustrates how profoundly relations between church and 
government had shifted in the minds of continental officials in America. At the beginning of the 
revolution, the Roman Catholic Church in British North America was under the governance of 
Thomas Talbot, Bishop of London. This proved difficult when the colonies declared their 
independence and the ensuing war dragged on for seven years. Contact with the church in 
London was cut off, making the consecration of priests, the confirmation of young parishioners, 
and other episcopal functions unavailable to the faithful in America. Upon the signing of the 
Treaty of Paris in 1783, Talbot declared that he no longer exercised ecclesial jurisdiction in the 
United States.259 
 In response to these difficulties, Catholics in Maryland and Pennsylvania gathered to 
devise a solution. The Rev. John Lewis had been appointed as vicar for the American churches 
by Talbot’s predecessor. Because of Talbot’s difficulty in communicating with America, Lewis 
had been exercising more supervisory authority. The American clergy were pleased with Lewis’ 
oversight, and in June 1783, they drew up a petition to the Pope requesting that Lewis be made 
both Superior and Bishop over the Church in the United States. In the petition, The Rev. John 
Carroll of Maryland provides intriguing commentary on the American Catholic view of church-
state relations under the Confederation: 
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You are not ignorant that in these United States our religious system has undergone 
a revolution, if possible, more extraordinary than our political one. In all of them 
free toleration is allowed to Christians of every denomination; and particularly in 
the States of Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, and Virginia, a communication of 
all civil rights, without distinction or diminution, is extended to those of our 
religion. This is a blessing and advantage which it is our duty to preserve and 
improve, with the utmost prudence, by demeaning ourselves on all occasions as 
subjects zealously attached to our government and avoiding to give any jealousies 
on account of any dependence on foreign jurisdictions more than that which is 
essential to our religion, an acknowledgment of the Pope’s spiritual supremacy over 
the whole Christian world.260 
Meanwhile, the Catholic clergy in France had plans of their own for the American 
Church. The Jesuits had flourished in America during the time of the London Bishop’s oversight, 
Talbot having been friendly to that order. However, clergy aligned with the Bourbon monarchs 
had urged Pope Clement XIV to dissolve the Society of Jesus, and they succeeded. The French 
clergy now sought to undermine the influence of the Jesuits in the infant United States.261 A 
plan, apparently originating with Barbe Marbois, the French Minister to the United States, 
received initial support from the Papal Nuncio in Paris. The Nuncio sent instructions to Marbois 
in Philadelphia, directing him to petition Congress for authority to appoint a Catholic bishop in 
the United States. That would have caused the new American Bishop to receive his instructions 
via church authorities in Paris. When Marbois sent the petition to Congress, he received an 
unexpected response, yet one that was revealing of American sentiments on relations between 
church and government. On May 11, 1784, the congressional journal records the following 
resolution: 
Resolved, That doctor [Benjamin] Franklin [U.S. Minister to France] be desired to 
notify to the apostolical nuncio at Versailles, that Congress will always be pleased 
to testify their respect to his sovereign and state; but that the subject of his 
application to doctor Franklin, being purely spiritual, it is without the jurisdiction 
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and powers of Congress, who have no authority to permit or refuse it, these powers 
being reserved to the several states individually.262 
Marbois’ petition was the sort of Old World religious intrigue that Americans abjured. When the 
French intentions became public, American Catholics reacted quickly with communications to 
Rome to counter the power play and prevent French interference. Pope Pius VI ordered that John 
Carroll be appointed Superior for the American clergy with the intent of consecrating him bishop 
within the year. A decree dated June 9, 1784, announcing this decision was sent to the American 
Catholic Church. In this way, the first American Catholic bishopric was formed, with The Most 
Rev. Carroll as bishop answering directly to the Pope. The incident confirms that in the new 
United States, any ecclesiastical jurisdictional disputes were outside the authority of the 
government.263 
The Louisiana Purchase of 1803 required early applications of the Religion Clauses. This 
vast land west of the Mississippi River held a French Catholic establishment which was later 
maintained by the Spanish. The new treaty and purchase agreement with France guaranteed the 
inhabitants their religious liberty—no small matter as the United States was perceived by the 
French inhabitants to be Protestant. The Catholic establishment in Louisiana quietly ceased to 
exist as the Spanish Crown no longer paid the priests and Spanish law no longer operated to 
support the church. For purposes of the incoming American federal administration, the land was 
divided into Orleans Territory, which would largely become the State of Louisiana, and the 
District of Louisiana (soon renamed the Missouri Territory), consisting of the rest of the 
purchase. In the spring of 1804, the governor of Orleans Territory wrote to Secretary of State 
Madison to inform him that local federal authorities had shut the doors of a Catholic parish 
church “in response to a conflict between two priests concerning who was the rightful leader of 
the congregation.”264 Although the territorial governor was clearly pleased with his manner of 
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handling the dispute, President Jefferson, who learned about it from Madison, was not.265 In a 
July 5, 1804, letter to Madison, Jefferson wrote: 
[I]t was an error in our officer to shut the doors of the church. . . . The priests must 
settle their differences in their own way, provided they commit no breach of the 
peace. . . . On our principles all church-discipline is voluntary; and never to be 
enforced by the public authority.266 
Jefferson’s warning to not get involved in matters of church polity nor the supervision and 
discipline of clergy, was passed from Madison back down to the territorial governor. Only a year 
went by before the governor had an opportunity to put to use Jefferson’s legal principle. In the 
summer of 1805, the governor became aware of a Spanish priest serving the Church of St. Louis 
in New Orleans. The priest was at odds with his superior, who as the Acting Vicar General was 
concerned that the priest might have retained his loyalties to Spain. The renegade priest was 
ordered removed by the vicar from his appointment to the Church of St. Louis. But the parish 
congregation resisted and allowed the priest to continue to conduct worship services. The vicar 
reported his dilemma to the territorial governor, an act characteristic of a state-established 
church. However, chastened by his earlier mishandling of religious affairs to the disappointment 
of Jefferson, the territorial governor did not get involved in the religious dispute. The governor 
did, however, ask for an interview with the wayward priest to enquire into possible sedition.267 
Some of the inhabitants of this former French territory had cause to be concerned for the 
security of their titles to land. An order of Ursuline nuns had operated a convent, orphanage, and 
school for girls and young women in New Orleans since 1727. The sisters had received their 
lands from the French Crown as a feature of the established church. The sisters wondered what 
this meant for their works of charity and education in a nation they regarded as Protestant but 
without an established religion. In a letter dated June 13, 1804, the Mother Superior of the 
convent wrote President Jefferson setting forth her anxieties about the security of title to the real 
estate used by the Ursuline ministries. A month later, on July 13, Jefferson responded with his 
own letter. He began by assuring the nuns that the transfer of control from Catholic France to the 
United States would not undermine the ownership of their religious school and the glebe lands 
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that supported it. However, Jefferson went further and assured the convent, school, and 
orphanage freedom of self-governance and freedom from the superintending hand of 
government. As the president explained, “the principles of the constitution . . . are a sure 
guaranty to you that [your property] will be preserved to you sacred and inviolate, and that your 
institution will be permitted to govern itself according to it’s [sic] own voluntary rules, without 
interference from the civil authority.”268 The latter—the ability to govern itself free of bylaws 
except those adopted voluntarily and self-enforced—was a liberty the Ursulines would not have 
enjoyed under the French establishment. 
These episodes give a taste of how the federal church-government understanding was 
implemented in the post-revolutionary period, and they show that church autonomy was 
presupposed where the government would otherwise have become entangled in the internal 
governance of religious ministries. These accounts confirm that Hosanna-Tabor and Our Lady 
were on target. 
 V.  CONCLUSION 
Over 230 years after adoption of the First Amendment, the doctrine of church autonomy, 
and its ministerial exception in particular, remain projects under development. Yet the most 
important features of these concepts were settled in Kedroff and Hosanna-Tabor. The Supreme 
Court has recognized the doctrine of church autonomy since at least Watson, and the doctrine has 
a body of precedent different from those lines of cases decided under the Free Exercise Clause 
and the Establishment Clause, respectively. Church autonomy protects churches, religious 
schools, and other genuinely religious organizations, but not as entities with freedom of 
association rights like any other organization, and not as mere voluntary associations 
representing the aggregate rights of their individual members. Rather, it protects them as 
ontological beings. Churches and other genuinely religious organizations are tacitly 
acknowledged by the U.S. Supreme Court to exist in their own right, and not because the 
government or the positive law is willing to recognize that they exist. Indeed, these organizations 
preexisted the state, and they transcend the state in that they are not confined to the recognized 
borders of a Westphalian state. The doctrine thereby has the state acknowledging that it is not all 
powerful. Surely this is an encouraging incident of secular modesty.  
 
268 Id. at 281. See generally id. at 278-81. 
64 
 
In an adversarial system, church autonomy will always be contested out on the frontiers. 
However, building on Watson and Kedroff, the High Court has strongly reaffirmed in the seminal 
case of Hosanna-Tabor that a religious organization’s internal governance is a government-free 
zone. And while the ministerial exception is an affirmative defense for purposes of pleading and 
pretrial practice, once its prima facie elements are proven-up by the religious organization the 
doctrine of church autonomy affords a categorical immunity, rooted in the Constitution, that 
cannot be waived—the strongest protection available in law. 
